The globalization of jihad has progressed through different phases over the last forty years. The Global Jihad Movement, which began with Al-Qaeda, has experienced diverse and distinct phases within itself. Al-Qaeda abandoned the defensive jihad, which was defined as the defense of the homeland in Afghanistan, and transitioned to offensive jihad, summarized by the phrase “destroy wherever you find.” While transforming every corner of the world into a jihad battleground, it also imposed a costly and continuous war doctrine on various organizations. This doctrine, particularly, posed significant challenges to nationalist organizations aiming to cleanse their lands of foreign forces and establish a state based on their own beliefs. For example, the Taliban in Afghanistan lost power in 2001 due to Al-Qaeda’s aggressive doctrine and had to struggle for nearly 20 years to regain control. The situation in Syria was no different. When the Syrian civil war began in 2011, two fronts emerged: the Free Syrian Army and the Al-Qaeda Network. Al-Qaeda’s first organization adopting the global jihad doctrine in Syria was the Nusra Front (NF). Established as a branch of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Nusra Front later pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda’s central leadership when the Iraqi branch transformed into the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and attempted to dominate it. Thus, three fronts were established within Syria: the Free Syrian Army, the Al-Qaeda Network, and ISIS.
ISIS pushed the boundaries of Al-Qaeda’s global jihad doctrine so far that it began to engulf every organization around it and spread violence across Europe. Even before seizing Mosul and declaring its so-called caliphate, a shooting at the Jewish Museum in Brussels on May 24, 2014, left four people dead. Following its declaration of the caliphate in Mosul on June 29, 2014, ISIS and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, gained superiority over all other organizations, demanding their allegiance. Those like Jolani and other groups, initially aiming to overthrow Assad and liberate Syria, suddenly found themselves in a position of declaring war against the entire world. This drove Nusra, which aimed for a Syria-centered local jihad, and its leader, Jolani, to seek new directions. This article should be read as an effort to understand how and why the Nusra Front transformed into Tahrir al-Sham and the journey of Jolani, now Ahmed al-Shara, in his campaign to overthrow Assad. It explores not only Jolani’s leadership but also the opportunities that led him down this path, alongside the shifting geopolitical dynamics of the countries managing the conflict.
El-Nusra
Nusra was initially established on January 23, 2012, in Syria as a branch of the Islamic State of Iraq, also known as al-Qaeda in Iraq. When the Islamic State of Iraq changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Colani declared in 2013 that he had pledged direct allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, thus formally breaking away from ISIS and solidifying Nusra’s connection to al-Qaeda. It should be noted here that allegiance to al-Qaeda was more about branding than adherence to a command-and-control hierarchy. This is why the first issue of El Risala, published in July 2015, carried the Tawhid Banner under the title “The al-Qaeda Organization of the Levant: Nusra Front.” The period of Nusra should be regarded as a time when Colani also carried the ideology of al-Qaeda. During this period, in line with the beliefs of jihadist Salafi ideology, the group engaged in destructive actions against shrines in the regions they controlled and adopted a harsh stance toward Sufi structures.
The bombing of the Armenian Church in Deir ez-Zor, the destruction of the 13th-century Imam Nawawi shrine in Nawa in southern Syria [1], and the destruction of the Sheikh Muhammad Hatat shrine in Old Aleppo can be seen as manifestations of this strict and rigid ideology in practice. [2] In a televised interview, Colani accused the Alawites of politically supporting the regime while also insisting that they must change their theological beliefs. [3]
When Nusra gained control over the Druze-inhabited region of Jabal al-Summaq, for instance, its regional emir, Abu Abdurrahman al-Tunisi, observed that some shrines were still standing. In January 2015, he requested that village representatives issue a second declaration renouncing the Druze faith. This declaration explicitly called for the destruction of shrines, focused on teaching Islam—particularly to the youth—and included adherence to Sharia rules on matters such as women’s clothing and gender mixing. This led to the destruction of remaining shrines such as the Sheikh Izzeddin and Sheikh Abu Salah shrines in Kaftin. Thus, al-Nusra was not only aligned with al-Qaeda but also adhered to its radical Salafi ideology, which was clearly reflected in its practices. So, why did al-Nusra feel the need to break away from al-Qaeda?
Why Did Nusra Reject Al-Qaeda?
One of the primary reasons was the rapid emergence of ISIS in the field and its dominance on the global agenda. With its extreme violence (live executions) and radical Salafi Takfiri ideology, ISIS not only drew intense international condemnation but also began clashing with different groups in the field by declaring them apostates. Jolani must have believed that remaining loyal to Al-Qaeda would increase his costs on the ground. Competing with ISIS through displays of violence was not a viable option. Jolani, possessing foresight and a sharp intellect, understood that ISIS would attract all the global attention and condemnation.
In this context, it is impossible not to mention Abu Mariya al-Qahtani. Qahtani was with Jolani during the founding of Nusra in 2011. Often presented as a religious scholar (alim, sheikh) by HTS supporters, Abu Mariya was first and foremost a commander and a man of action. He was always seen by Jolani’s side. Qahtani was a pivotal figure in guiding Jolani with his religious and scholarly ideas during Nusra’s transformation into HTS. On April 4, 2024, he was killed in a suicide bombing in the town of Sarmada, located in Idlib’s countryside. Sources close to HTS alleged that the attack was carried out by ISIS.
Between 2014 and 2015, Qahtani played a leading role as an ideologue fighting against ISIS’s “extremists.” In numerous articles and audio statements, he referred to ISIS as “the Kharijites of this era” and harshly criticized the group for declaring Muslims apostates and spilling Muslim blood. In one of his writings, he condemned suicide attacks in marketplaces that caused mass civilian casualties and criticized some jihadist leaders and scholars for failing to denounce extreme takfirism. Even while Nusra was still loyal to Al-Qaeda, Abu Mariya did not hesitate to criticize Al-Qaeda and its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Perhaps his early disappointment with Al-Qaeda’s leadership planted the seeds for his later conclusion that the group had outlived its time. Among the leaders advocating for Nusra’s separation from Al-Qaeda and eventual transformation into HTS during 2016–2017, Qahtani was one of the most resolute. [4]
By 2016, the rebellion had lost control over most of its previously held territories, including Aleppo in the north. The remaining stronghold was in the northwest, meaning that preserving what was left of the armed opposition and sustaining the war effort required unification under the same organizational umbrella. Localization and unification efforts could not be achieved with the exclusive identity of ISIS or Al-Qaeda’s ideology. Jolani was Syrian, the son of a Pan-Arabist intellectual father. His goal was more about saving Syria, his father’s homeland, than continuing a global jihad movement. [5] Therefore, his need to localize appears to have stemmed, in part, from his allegiance to Syria.
In 2016 and 2017, U.S. airstrikes inadvertently benefited Nusra. Over the years, Al-Qaeda’s prominent fighters were killed one after another by U.S. drones, contributing to the transformation of Nusra’s leadership. These targeted killings helped “Syrianize” Nusra’s leadership around Jolani.
The rejection of global jihad was officially finalized in July 2016, when Nusra severed its ties with Al-Qaeda and renamed itself Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (The Front for the Liberation of the Levant). The name change was intended solely to emphasize the break from Al-Qaeda. In January 2017, the establishment of HTS aimed, in contrast, to unite all armed opposition against the regime. Jolani was simultaneously shedding the Al-Qaeda baggage and completing the steps to localize his organization.
The Establishment of the Salvation Government
HTS’s departure from its Al-Qaeda baggage also influenced its operational style. Abandoning the guerrilla warfare long employed by Al-Qaeda, it began efforts to settle in Idlib’s center. To this end, HTS encouraged the establishment of the Salvation Government, a technocratic administration independent of its military wing, to build a city-state model. It constructed hospitals and schools, provided municipal services, and reinvested taxes collected from the city back into the city’s development. Over time, it transformed the city into a metropolis with a population of four million. The Salvation Government significantly differed from the judicial systems supported by traditional Salafi-jihadist groups, which are characterized by their ideological rigidity and harsh governance. It delegated many of its primary powers to other local and international actors. Unlike other Salafi-jihadist groups, the Salvation Government did not impose minority status or taxes (jizya) on religious minorities such as Christians. The Syrian Salvation Government, composed of ten ministries, established a Directorate of Culture directly reporting to the Council of Ministers. Subsequently, the Directorate of Antiquities in Idlib was formed under the Directorate of Culture, tasked with preserving and restoring historical artifacts within the Salvation Government’s territories. The Directorate of Culture allowed the government to take advanced measures for the protection of antiquities, such as founding the Idlib Museum and preserving historical sites. These steps marked a significant departure from conventional Salafi-jihadist practices, prompting criticism from extremists, some of whom chose to leave the organization.
Transitioning from a closed, military structure listed as a terrorist organization to a body controlling a vast geographical area, equipped with economic resources and a technocratic government, provided HTS with increased international recognition and opportunities to establish relations with other countries. Distancing itself from Al-Qaeda helped it gain the trust of international donors. [7] HTS sent a clear message regarding its commitment to ideological and behavioral transformation through its intense military struggle against ISIS in the Hama desert and the early elimination of Al-Qaeda’s leadership cadre by security forces.
HTS demonstrated this shift in the field as well, engaging in armed conflict with extremists who broke away from it. Many jihadists dissatisfied with HTS’s localization and separation from Al-Qaeda left to establish or join other jihadist groups. In early 2018, a group of fighters who left HTS officially announced the creation of Hurras al-Din (Guardians of Religion), a new Al-Qaeda-affiliated group led by Abu Humam al-Shami. Other jihadists joined pre-existing groups such as Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Tawhid. However, these seemingly rival jihadist actors, particularly as ISIS’s influence and presence diminished, ended up indirectly serving HTS’s strategies by maintaining claims of moderation and centrism. HTS labeled its battles with these groups as a fight against extremism and takfir, ultimately eliminating them all.
In conclusion, the image of moderation allowed Jolani greater freedom to implement his strategic plans centered on maintaining de facto military and administrative control over Idlib province. The Idlib experience validated Jolani’s belief in the benefits of localization and territorial permanence. He even found opportunities to establish connections with foreign countries, aiming to transform these relationships into strategic alliances. Operating in an economically devastated country, he had a significant need for external aid and funding. Jolani learned that moderation could yield gains.
He applied this principle to the military sphere as well, transitioning from guerrilla tactics to a more professional military structure. The composition and operational methods of most local military brigades were reorganized based on their organizational and professional levels rather than any ideological particularities. HTS established a police academy and a military college, laying the groundwork for a potential unified and regular army in the future. More importantly, the institutionalization of military operations helped HTS control most foreign fighters within and outside its ranks. Foreign fighters no longer represented an independent power base within HTS. Furthermore, foreign-led groups were no longer able to operate independently and were required to submit to HTS leadership.
The Decisive Blow
The decisive blow that severed HTS’s ties with Al-Qaeda entirely came once again from Abu Mariya al-Qahtani. Two weeks after the death of Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri on July 31, 2022, he published his advice, “Nasihat,” on August 15 via a Telegram channel with over 100,000 followers. “Nasihat” consisted of two parts: the first was a brief note calling on members of the Muslim Brotherhood to dissolve the organization due to its history of disappointment and failure. The second part, titled “My Advice to the Branches of Al-Qaeda,” urged the dissolution of Al-Qaeda and the elimination of excuses used by states that viewed Al-Qaeda as a scapegoat. This suggestion was prompted by the leadership being taken over by Saif al-Adl, known to be imprisoned in Iran following Ayman’s death.
However, the second reason behind the proposed dissolution was Abu Mariya’s belief that Al-Qaeda’s jihad strategy was outdated. According to him, Sunni Arab jihadist states should unite against Iran. “The Islamic ummah,” he wrote, “must stand together and form an alliance against the Iranian occupation, which has seized a number of Arab Muslim capitals and threatens others.” Structures like Al-Qaeda hindered the unification of Sunni communities against Iran. Al-Qaeda was not acting against Iran, while Kahtani believed the Islamic ummah should prioritize uniting against Iran. [8]
Everything happened just as Abu Mariya al-Qahtani had predicted. Although he was killed in a suicide bombing and did not live to see these days, HTS managed to fulfill the desire of many in the Middle East to send Iran packing. With Hezbollah and Iran weakened in the aftermath of the Gaza-Israel war and Russia preoccupied with Ukraine, HTS overthrew Assad after 13 years and captured Damascus. This outcome appears to have pleased Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, the UAE, Israel, and the United States. Türkiye, too, benefitted by ridding itself of Assad, whom it failed to bring to the negotiation table, and finding an honorable path for the migrants it had hosted for years at great expense. HTS’s localization and its exclusive focus on Syria seem to have satisfied everyone except Russia and Iran.
Conclusion
Let’s acknowledge that HTS’s past reveals the existence of an organization where women’s lives were controlled, hisbah and morality police patrolled the markets, and harsh, exclusionary policies were enforced against minorities. Yet, before us now stands a leader of an organization that has localized in Syria, distanced itself from global jihadist doctrine, strives for international recognition, and focuses on rebuilding Syria. Consequently, internal competition, the desire for localization, Syrian nationalism, the Idlib experience, securing external funds, and ideological struggles have pushed it toward a more moderate path. Partly due to the circumstances of life and contextual factors, and partly because of its past, it has become deeply tied to Syria. He now calls himself Ahmed al-Shara. He resembles an ambitious politician. Perhaps giving him this opportunity could benefit everyone. However, let’s admit that as he changes, resistance to him will likely emerge from among his former allies. Both Al-Qaeda and ISIS are eagerly waiting for an opportunity to label him as a Western-aligned politician who sold out the revolution. He has inherited a country burdened by severe economic conditions and must govern an army. He wants to hold Syria together as one and whole without breaking it apart.
The transitional government established in Syria has recognized the official Syrian flag as the revolutionary flag. In an interview with CNN, Jolani spoke of a parliament elected by the people, and a spokesperson for the Damascus Political Affairs Directorate stated that a constitutional committee would be formed to review and amend the previous constitution, declaring that the New Syria would uphold justice and the rule of law.[9] It appears that what stands before us is not an organization transformed from Al-Qaeda but rather a nationalist political party promising the construction of a nation-state. In every statement, there is mention of Arabs and Syria. It would not be surprising to see him fully transform into a Syrian nationalist.
However, there are threats that lie ahead. The most significant is that if the newly established administration fails to meet expectations, the dispersed army could go underground and start a resistance, as it happened in Iraq. Secondly, there are, of course, radical Salafists who will be dissatisfied with this transformation. If they fail to find an “Islamic” order according to their expectations from the new administration and government, they may retreat to rural areas and declare jihad against Jolani. Thirdly, ISIS, which has managed to remain hidden, could resurface from the desert, much like ISIS-K in Afghanistan, which has launched fierce opposition against the Taliban government.
As an organization capable of expelling its own radicals and absorbing groups at will, HTS is in the process of evolving into a “state.” Whether it will succeed in this evolution is something we will all see in the coming period.
References
1 Nusra İmam Nevevi’nin Türbesini Yıktı, https://www.haber7.com/ortadogu/haber/1267344-nusra-imam-nevevinin-turbesini-yikti.
2 Adnan Almohamad -Amir Alabdullah, Jabhat al-Nusra’s attitudes towards tangible heritage in Syria: the disengagement from Alqaeda, Journal of Conflict Archaeology, DOI: 10.1080/15740773.2024.2383888.
3 AlJazeera Arabic, youtube.com/watch?v=LK3QCWTPz_4.
4 “Dissolve al-Qaida”: The Advice of Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, https://www.jihadica.com/dissolve-al-qaida/.
5 https://urad.org.tr/tr/kim-kimdir/tahrir-el-sam-lideri-colani-kimdir.
6 Adnan Almohamad -Amir Alabdullah, Jabhat al-Nusra’s attitudes towards tangible heritage in Syria: the disengagement from Alqaeda, Journal of Conflict Archaeology, DOI: 10.1080/15740773.2024.2383888.
7 The Syria Effect: Al-Qaeda Fractures, https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/the-syria-effect-al-qaeda-fractures.
8 “Dissolve al-Qaida”: The Advice of Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, https://www.jihadica.com/dissolve-al-qaida/
9 Syrian rebel leader says goal is to ‘overthrow’ Assad regime, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/06/middleeast/syria-rebel-forces-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-al-jolani-intl-latam/index.html.
