Recent public opinion polls in Türkiye indicate that the AK Party, which emerged as the leading party in the 2023 elections, has seen a relative decline in its vote share and has dropped to second place. This shift suggests that segments of the electorate have changed their voting preferences. Understanding the distinction between voters who maintain their preferences and those who switch is critically important, as such an analysis offers clearer insight into the probabilities surrounding the next election.
This study examines the likelihood of voters who supported the AK Party or the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in the 2023 elections voting for a different party in the next election, based on their ideological positioning and perceptions of the economy. The findings reveal that this group of voters exhibits notably diverse voting behavior tendencies depending on their ideological stance and economic perceptions.
Numerous academic studies have shown that ideology plays a decisive role in shaping voter behavior.[1] Accordingly, we begin our analysis by examining ideological positioning. In this regard, let us consider the most recent survey conducted by the Institute for Social Studies (Toplum Çalışmaları Enstitüsü) on June 19, 2025, in which respondents were asked: “If you were to position your political views, how would you rate yourself on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = Far Left, 3 = Center, and 5 = Far Right?”
Using a Probit model, the responses of individuals who voted for the AK Party or MHP in the 2023 elections to the question “If a parliamentary general election were held today, which party would you vote for?” were analyzed in relation to this ideological self-positioning. Since this piece is intended for a general audience, the model specifications and results are provided in the “Appendix” section.
The results of the first model reveal that AK Party and MHP voters who identify as left/center (positions 1–3) have a 23% probability of voting for another party, while that probability drops to 13% among those identifying as right-wing (positions 4–5). This statistically significant difference underscores the strong explanatory power of ideological stance in understanding variability in vote preferences.
Why is this result important for the upcoming elections, and what role might it play? Among voters who currently say they would vote for the AK Party or MHP if an election were held today, 33.88% identify their ideological position as between 1 and 3, with 30.7% specifically selecting “3 – Center.”
Another key factor influencing voter behavior is the individual’s level of economic satisfaction.[2] Survey respondents were asked: “How would you rate your current economic situation on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = Not at all satisfactory and 5 = Very satisfactory?”
As in the previous analysis, the responses of voters who supported the AK Party or MHP in the 2023 elections to the question “If a parliamentary general election were held today, which party would you vote for?” were analyzed based on their level of economic satisfaction.
The second model’s results show that voters with low levels of economic satisfaction (scores of 1–2) have a 29.7% likelihood of voting outside the AK Party-MHP bloc in the next election, compared to just 7.7% among those with high satisfaction levels (scores of 4–5). The 22-percentage-point difference indicates that perceptions of economic well-being are an even stronger determinant of vote-switching than ideological alignment. This effect is also statistically significant. Thus, it is fair to say that party loyalty is considerably weaker among voters within the ruling bloc who experience economic dissatisfaction.
Moreover, it should be noted that 30.2% of respondents who say they would vote for either the AK Party or MHP today fall into the lowest two categories (1 and 2) in terms of economic satisfaction.
However, according to economic theory, economic satisfaction is not the sole factor influencing voting behavior. An individual’s expectations about how political parties or figures will manage the economy in the future also play a significant role.[3]
In this context, the following survey question was analyzed: “How do you think the Turkish economy will perform over the next year? Please rate your view on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = Much worse and 5 = Much better.”
The third model shows that voters who expect the economy to worsen (scores of 1–2) are significantly more likely to vote outside the AK Party/MHP bloc compared to those who believe the economy will improve (scores of 4–5). According to the model, 40.9% of those with a pessimistic economic outlook are likely to switch their vote, while this rate drops to just 5.9% among those with an optimistic view. The ≈35.1-point difference starkly reveals how economic pessimism can substantially weaken voter loyalty.
It is also worth noting that 20.7% of voters who say they would vote for either the AK Party or MHP in an election held tomorrow fall into the group that believes the economy will deteriorate.
This study compares the voter groups from which the AK Party and MHP are losing support with the opposition’s potential to gain votes, while also mapping the current distribution of voters within the AK Party/MHP bloc. It thereby clarifies the opportunities and risks for all parties heading into the next election.
The analyses show that AK Party/MHP voters who position themselves ideologically in the center are relatively more likely to switch their vote. However, the truly decisive factor is voters’ perceptions of economic satisfaction. According to the models, economic expectations and dissatisfaction affect the decision to vote for another party far more strongly than ideological stance.
Türkiye’s economic policy actions between now and the next elections will directly shape both the public’s current level of satisfaction and their confidence in the future. Therefore, depending on these two dimensions, the road to the elections presents a window of opportunity for all parties.
Finally, it should be noted that similar methods have also been applied to presidential election survey data. While various scenarios and the respective vote shares of Erdoğan and his opponent have already been publicly shared, our analyses identify the candidate with the greatest potential to draw votes away from Erdoğan. Once our work on the data is complete, this assessment will also be shared with the public without delay.
Appendix
Model: Ideological Positioning Model
Respondents who participated in the survey and declared that they voted for the AK Party or MHP in the 2023 elections were asked the question: “If an election were held today, would you vote for a party other than the AK Party/MHP?” Based on their responses, the dependent variable Y was coded as 1 = “vote switching” and 0 = “vote retention.”
The ideological position question, in which participants rated themselves on a scale from 1 = Far Left to 5 = Far Right, was cleaned of textual and numerical inconsistencies and converted to a standardized 1–5 scale. It was then recoded into a binary indicator variable, ideo_low, representing “left/center” (1–3 → 1) and “right” (4–5 → 0).
The model outputs are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Ideological Positioning Model
- Model: Current Economic Satisfaction Model
Within the same sample, participants were asked to evaluate their current economic situation using the question:
“How would you rate your current economic situation on a scale from 1 = Not at all satisfactory to 5 = Very satisfactory?”
Responses were first standardized by converting textual labels into numerical values based on the initial numeric prefix, resulting in a uniform 1–5 scale. From this scale:
- Responses of 1–2 were categorized as “low satisfaction” (econ_low = 1),
- Responses of 4–5 were categorized as “high satisfaction” (econ_low = 0),
- Responses of 3 (“neutral”) were excluded from the analysis.
The model outputs are presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Current Economic Satisfaction Model
Model 3: Future Economic Expectation Model
The same participants were asked the question:
“In the next year, do you think the Turkish economy will be much worse, worse, stay the same, improve, or be much better?”
As in previous models, responses were standardized by extracting and converting the text labels and numeric prefixes into a uniform 1–5 scale. Based on this:
- Responses of 1–2 were categorized as “pessimistic expectation” (future_low = 1),
- Responses of 4–5 were categorized as “optimistic expectation” (future_low = 0),
- Responses of 3 (“neutral”) were excluded from the analysis.
The model outputs are presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Future Economic Expectation Model
Footnotes
[1] Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper.
Miller, W. E., & Shanks, J. M. (1996). The New American Voter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[2] Powell, G. B., Jr., & Whitten, G. D. (1993). A Cross‐National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context. American Journal of Political Science, 37(2), 391–414.
Lewis‐Beck, M. S., & Stegmaier, M. (2011). Economic voting theory: Testing new dimensions. Electoral Studies, 30(1), 144–153.
[3] MacKuen, M. B., Erikson, R. S., & Stimson, J. A. (1992). Peasants or Banker’s Dozen? The Amazing Persistence of Economic Voting. American Political Science Review, 86(4), 951–964.
Kumlin, S., Stjernström, M., & Berg, A. (2022). Prospective economic voting: The effect of expectations on vote choice. Political Behavior, 44(2), 643–660.
