The story of Banksy’s “Girl with Balloon” is fascinating and enlightening from an art history perspective. The moment it was sold at auction, the artwork was shredded by a hidden destruction machine inside the frame. The collector who bought the piece was left in shock. Much like the public reaction to the events unfolding in Lebanon…
These kinds of attacks violate both fundamental human rights and numerous United Nations resolutions, as they impact civilians and turn information and communication technologies into weapons of war.
The Attack in Lebanon
Israel, often considered the usual suspect, shook the world on September 17-18 with an incident in Lebanon involving the explosion of approximately 5,000 communication devices. Initially, it was believed to be a cyberattack, with the devices thought to have been remotely detonated through such an attack. Naturally, this led the public into fear and anxiety. TV stations, radios, websites, and social media were abuzz with discussions about it. As time went on, two dominant views emerged. Either the explosion was caused by the battery, or explosives had been placed inside the devices. After a while, the “explosives” theory gained traction, and the focus shifted to investigating the companies responsible for supplying the devices. Currently, the prevailing public opinion is that explosives were indeed placed inside the devices.
According to the “explosive” theory, those who organized the attack had infiltrated the “supply chain” using human and/or technical intelligence, inserting explosives either during production or transportation. Let’s think together: Would an actor who went through all this trouble just place explosives? Or, taking advantage of their access to the devices, could the real aim have been to plant “bugs” for listening and location tracking, alongside tools to destroy the devices when necessary? Could the real goal have been to locate these devices and use them to eavesdrop on the entire environment? Could it be that what was destroyed in the explosions was actually a surveillance infrastructure? This scenario, reminiscent of the “Mission Impossible” films, seems more plausible.
Supply Chain Security
Commercial off-the-shelf products (COTS) hold a significant place in the infrastructure of many security organizations. These should not be considered solely as end products; they can also be components of an integrated system with similar features. Countries, especially when they lack the ability to produce their own technology, may procure products from the market. Qualified security organizations have standards for these types of procurement processes. Every product purchased under these standards is assessed for the risk of explosives and surveillance devices. Those interested can research “handheld explosive trace detectors.”
Except for technologies designed specifically for self-destruction, if such findings are encountered, the products are generally not used, and trust with the supplier is broken. It seems that Hezbollah in Lebanon struggled to manage its procurement processes well. This situation will lead to the reassessment of many trust relationships in the region and the world. Taking a broader view, it may be useful to evaluate the international peace thesis, based on commercial mercantilism, alongside the multi-polar balance of power thesis. Here, the greatest strength lies in domestic production capability and sustainable friendly consumption.
Cyber-Physical Attacks
With the events in Lebanon, “cybersecurity” has once again become a hot topic. Incidents that affect the physical world through cyber means are called cyber-physical attacks. Cyber-physical incidents are not new. Examples include the explosion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in Refahiye, the disruption of the banking sector in Estonia following a cyberattack linked to Russia, and the attack on Ukraine’s electrical infrastructure. There is also another interesting incident from 2019.
In 2019, following a cyberattack by Hamas on Israel, the Israeli army bombed Hamas hackers. This event is considered the first of its kind. A kinetic response to a cyberattack may not seem compatible with the principle of reciprocity in many respects. However, this indicates that cyberattacks are now being treated as equivalent to physical attacks. Similarly, NATO’s cyber warfare manual, the “Tallinn Manual,” is important because it establishes that a cyberattack on one NATO member is considered an attack on all NATO members.
The Cognitive Aspect of Hybrid Warfare
Frankly, the above will not surprise many people closely related to this field. Let’s take it a step further and consider the secondary consequences of such attacks.
There is also the psychological warfare aspect. The attack in Lebanon may have caused a serious psychological breakdown within Hezbollah, not only due to its physical impact but also on a psychological level. No one on the ground would want to approach someone carrying electronic technology. They wouldn’t want to use technology whose source they couldn’t trust. This initially psychological effect, by disrupting an organization’s relationship with technology, can technologically set the affected organization back about 20-30 years, like a time machine.
Another angle is the cognitive aspect. Low-intensity and asymmetric warfare methods create significant cognitive effects on the affected organizations and the communities that support them. Cognitive disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder, mood disorders, dissociative disorders, and attention deficit, which were once considered issues of morale, have now evolved into mass states of mind. One of the most fundamental examples of this is the worldwide question that arose after the incident in Lebanon: “Can our phones be remotely detonated?” Regardless of the answer, the situation has reached a point where the more this discussion continues, the more established institutions are eroded, and it turns into a kind of societal hysteria.
In addition to all these aspects of hybrid warfare, the shift of the war to social media and the psychological operations conducted there target the ontology of organizations. After the events in Lebanon, some social media posts from troll accounts close to Israel were very interesting: Messages written on pagers like “72 Virgins” and the triggering of “castration complex” through the injuries suffered by those affected in the attacks created an effect akin to the disintegration of the “id” within organizations.
Faced with all this, politics is left with no tools other than faith and belonging. This is another way to explain the rising right-wing movements and the polarizing religiosity around the world. From a scientific perspective, the only viable work that can be done on this subject involves interdisciplinary or multi-disciplinary studies. Vertical specialization will not lose its importance, but it would be wise not to overlook the neo-generalist perspective.
As for Banksy, as an artist who doesn’t particularly like selling his works, he is likely content with the outcome. Meanwhile, the auction house that sold the piece made good money. Although the collector who bought the work was initially unhappy, later they experienced an epistemological rupture in their understanding of art and interpreted the situation in a post-modern way. In the end, they became the owner of a work that will go down in art history. Meanwhile, Banksy played with all of our perceptions. By saying, “You can’t buy art with money,” he carried out his ontological attack. I think we have much to learn from Banksy when it comes to war.
