A political party’s chair’s proposal that “the President should have two vice presidents, one Kurdish and the other Alevi” has set off a debate that affects the dynamics of identity, representation, and integration in Türkiye. The proposal brings with it critical debates in terms of the dynamics of the nation-state, the nation, and national identity. As a potential step toward the institutionalization of ethnic and religious differences within the state structure, an analysis of this proposal’s multidimensional consequences is of great importance to prevent adverse effects that may arise in the future. At the same time, the proposal is a statement open to many interpretations along the axes of identity politics and social integration, requiring in-depth analysis from the perspectives of social psychology, sociology, and political science.
In a political environment where the strengthening of national unity and a shared identity is aimed, emphasizing representation based on ethnic and religious affiliations carries the risk of producing a divisive effect. Such institutionalization may weaken social integration by leading to individuals being defined through sub-identities rather than a common national identity. While national identity is built upon shared values, history, and goals, encouraging arrangements on ethnic and religious bases may erode these integrative elements. Such proposals need to be evaluated in detail from the perspective of strengthening national identity and ensuring social integration, and measures should be taken against potential negative effects.
This proposal entails the danger of reducing political representation to identity groups instead of merit and universal values. In the modern conception of the state, individuals’ abilities and qualifications should be at the forefront. Presenting ethnic or religious origin as a criterion for appointment to office is contrary to the principle of meritocracy. This may strengthen the perception of discrimination in society and lay the groundwork for new tensions among different ethnic and religious groups. By creating a perception similar to quota systems among different identity groups, this approach causes politics to turn into identity-based competition. This may lead political debates and policies to take shape around narrow group interests rather than national interests. With similar demands potentially coming from other ethnic or religious groups in the future, the risk of instability and fragmentation in state governance may increase. In this context, this proposal contains potential consequences that could threaten Türkiye’s national unity, social cohesion, and political stability.
In a political environment where the strengthening of national unity and a shared identity is aimed, emphasizing representation based on ethnic and religious affiliations carries the risk of creating a divisive effect. Such institutionalization may weaken social integration by leading to individuals being defined through sub-identities rather than a common national identity. While national identity is built upon shared values, history, and common goals for the future, encouraging structuring on an ethnic and religious basis may erode these integrative elements.
By creating a perception similar to quota systems among different identity groups, this approach will cause politics to turn into identity-based competition. This will lead political debates and policies to take shape around narrow group interests rather than national interests. With similar demands coming from other ethnic or religious groups in the future, the risk of instability and fragmentation in state governance may increase. In this context, this proposal harbors potential consequences that may threaten Türkiye’s national unity, social cohesion, and political stability.
A Multi-Faceted Discussion of the Representation of Ethnic and Religious Identities
From a social-psychology perspective, this proposal can be evaluated within the context of in-group/out-group dynamics and identity politics. Nationalism generally defines a nation as a common in-group. In Türkiye, different ethnic or religious groups such as Kurds and Alevis—who are an inseparable part of the Turkish nation—are not, in terms of citizenship, viewed as outside the national whole or as separate sub-groups. They can, however, be repositioned within the framework of in-group/out-group distinctions that form within sub-national structures. Yet by separately labeling these groups as “different” or “special” categories, the proposal has the potential to weaken the homogenizing effect under the umbrella of national identity. In other words, instead of an inclusive national identity, it may reinforce the differentiation of identities on an ethnic or religious basis. In terms of representation and belonging, the proposal may aim to strengthen the sense of belonging of the groups in question by ensuring their representation at the highest echelon of the state. Moreover, from a social-psychological standpoint, it can be argued that when individuals see their own groups participating in political processes and decision-making mechanisms, their trust in and attachment to the system increase. However, presenting this representation through a “quota-based” approach carries the risk of sharpening the emphasis on “difference” and harming the feeling of being “one and whole.” The validity of the proposal in terms of the principle of representation can also be questioned, considering that the vice president may already be of Kurdish origin, since all citizens in the country are equal and may serve at all levels of the state commensurate with their merit.
Sociologically, this proposal is closely related to debates on multiculturalism and social integration. By virtue of its historical and demographic makeup, Türkiye is a multicultural society that encompasses different ethnic and religious groups, but it does not have a multiculturalist political system. The proposal may be interpreted as the state’s formal recognition of this multicultural structure and an effort to integrate these groups into the political order. What matters sociologically, however, is whether such representation is symbolic or a genuine sharing of power. Symbolic representations may prove insufficient in reducing social tensions. Recognizing such representations as a political entity carries the potential to activate dynamics of separation and conflict rather than reconciliation.
Social Integration and National Identity
From the standpoint of social integration, if national identity is accepted as “an inclusive identity above all social differences,” then in this context the proposal may undermine integration by emphasizing distinct identities. The opposite claim might be that integration can be reinforced by including excluded groups in politics; however, this claim does not accord with current political practices. The issue here is how the person who will ensure the representation of the “excluded groups” is to be chosen, and whether this situation requires the institutional representation of differences. If such representation is not seen as part of the overall national identity, it encourages division. However, the problem here focuses on how the person who will ensure the representation of the “excluded groups” will be chosen. This, in turn, requires the institutional representation of differences. If such representation is not seen as part of the overall national identity, it will encourage division. According to those who advocate the institutionalization of differences, different groups’ feeling that they are represented within the system may also be a factor that strengthens national unity. The concrete divisive potential of institutionalizing differences cannot be compensated merely by “feelings.”
Politically, the proposal can also be examined from the perspectives of power-sharing, political legitimacy, and electoral strategies. According to groups that defend multiculturalism, making room for different groups in the political system means strengthening democratic representation. Allocating important positions such as the vice presidency to particular ethnic or religious groups may enable these groups to have a say within the state apparatus and allow them to be influential in the shaping of policies. It may increase the confidence in the state of groups that may feel marginalized and consolidate political legitimacy. However, examples such as Lebanon and Yugoslavia show that where national identity has been dismantled and sub-structures institutionalized, the state and society split into ethnic and religious sections, resulting in conflict and fragmentation.
This proposal can also be seen as an electoral strategy. It may aim to attract the votes of Kurdish and Alevi constituencies, strengthen alliances, or alleviate social unrest. However, the sincerity and long-term effects of such a proposal depend on the intentions of political actors and the manner in which it is implemented. Politicians’ statements of this kind typically reflect both their ideological stance and the advantages they seek to obtain within the current political conjuncture. Although it conflicts with nationalism’s definition as “an inclusive identity above all social differences,” certain liberal-nationalist approaches in Europe attach importance to integrating minority groups into the system in order to secure the unity of the nation-state. What matters here is whether this integration is “assimilative” or carried out “on the basis of agreed-upon values.” In short, while the proposal carries a claim of fostering potential inclusivity and belonging, it also harbors the risk of politicizing identities. This proposal has initiated an important debate about how “inclusive” national identity and the national institution of citizenship are, and how they address differences. Yet if such an approach is misunderstood or abused, it may deepen divisions rather than strengthen social peace and unity.
Reflections of the Representation Proposal Across Different Groups
How the statement will be evaluated by separatist groups is a complex matter. These groups’ own ideologies, goals, and perspectives on the current political conjuncture shape their reactions to this statement. Ethnically based separatist groups generally find such a proposal insufficient and insincere. In their view, representing Kurdish identity merely through a vice-presidential post falls far short of addressing the historical, cultural, and political demands of the Kurdish people. They consider such a step to be a symbolic “carrot” or “democratic window-dressing” aimed at international public opinion rather than a genuine recognition of rights and autonomy. They argue that the “Kurdish question” must be addressed not only through political representation but also on broader fronts such as constitutional rights, education in the mother tongue, and autonomy in local administrations.
Groups with secessionist ideologies may also interpret the statement as a step taken to reinforce the unitary structure of the state and prevent separatism. They may think the aim is to increase Kurds’ and Alevis’ attachment to the state by representing these identities at the highest levels and thereby weaken secessionist tendencies. From this perspective, the proposal is seen as an “integration effort to prevent fragmentation,” and separatist groups assess it as a development that runs counter to their objectives. The nationalist identity of the person who uttered the statement may lead to the perception that this proposal is “a breach opened in the wall.” Some separatist groups may view such a proposal as part of a strategy to manage differences and leverage social fault lines to their own advantage. They may claim that the state is attempting to weaken social opposition by dividing different identity groups within themselves or by “rewarding” certain groups. They may criticize that “even among Kurds and Alevis, by granting office to particular individuals, the demands of the broader masses are being ignored.”
Reflections Among Separatist Groups
Separatist groups—especially those that carry out terrorist acts and use violence—tend to regard themselves as the sole and legitimate representative of the group in question. For this reason, they may perceive the state’s appointment or assignment, by direct designation, of a “Kurdish” or “Alevi” representative as a blow to their own legitimacy. They may claim that such a representative lacks sufficient support and trust among their base and is therefore a “state-selected” figure.
Among Alevi groups, separatist or radical elements generally have a motivation different from ethnically based separatists. Their demands focus more on freedom of belief, equal citizenship, the status of cemevis, and an end to discrimination. If the statement in question is not seen as a sincere step, it may be evaluated as an “effort to integrate Alevis into the system” or as “deferring the real problems.” However, for some Alevi constituencies, this can also be viewed as a positive beginning for the official recognition of Alevism at the state level and the provision of equal representation. Alevi groups described as separatist often claim that the state does not adequately uphold the principle of secularism and favors Sunni Islam. In this context, the proposal can be considered in terms of making Alevis more visible in the public sphere. Separatist groups generally tend to assess this statement within their own ideological framework as an integration effort that is insufficient, insincere, or contrary to their goals. They may view such symbolic steps as aimed not at solving deep-seated structural problems but at “managing the issue” or “displaying goodwill to external audiences.”
Societal and Cultural Consequences of the Proposal: Opportunities and Risks
Implementing the proposal would produce varied and multifaceted consequences for Türkiye’s political, social, and cultural structure. Those who argue that it may yield positive social and cultural outcomes approach the issue especially from the standpoint of strengthening the sense of representation and belonging. According to this view, the proposal may be an important step for Kurdish and Alevi citizens who, for many years, have felt insufficiently represented in the public sphere. Having someone from their own identities at the highest level of the state may increase these groups’ sense of belonging to the state and help them feel more like “a part of this country.” This may contribute to social peace, particularly among segments that experience a feeling of exclusion. Moreover, the formalization by political elites of Türkiye’s multicultural structure in this way can increase awareness of and respect for the country’s cultural diversity. The representation of Kurdish and Alevi identities at the state level raises these identities’ visibility in the public sphere and has the potential to reduce prejudices against these groups across society. Even if symbolic, it can be an important step toward reducing polarization. The joint representation of different identities can strengthen the ground for dialogue and reconciliation. In this way, misunderstandings and hostilities regarding groups perceived as “the other” may diminish.
Those who focus on the negative social and cultural consequences take a realist approach. From this standpoint, what is at issue is the labeling of identities and the deepening of fragmentation. The proposal contradicts a nationalist understanding that defines national identity as an inclusive superordinate identity. Such “quota-based representation” can fix Kurdish and Alevi identities as categories separate from other social segments. This would reinforce the “us” versus “them” divide and, instead of the expected integration, could deepen social fragmentation. Such an appointment could veil the structural problems faced by citizens of Kurdish and Alevi origin (economic inequality, discrimination, etc.) and remain a symbolic step far from offering a real solution. This, in turn, would lead to the continuation—and even the increase—of social discontent.
Kurdish and Alevi citizens are not homogeneous entities in themselves. There are different political views and social strata within these groups. The identity or representational capacity of those to be appointed would trigger a struggle over representation within these groups and heighten internal tensions. Opening a special representational space for Kurdish and Alevi groups could prompt similar demands from other ethnic or cultural groups (for example, Laz, Circassians, Syriacs, Roma, etc.). This would lead to further fragmentation of the political order and an increase in social comparisons. Each group’s demand for its own representative would weaken national unity. In addition, there is always the risk that such a proposal could be used as a populist discourse aimed at securing the votes of certain groups or broadening a political base. In sum, the social and cultural consequences of this proposal depend on how it is implemented, how society perceives this step, and the sincerity of the political will on this issue. The proposal carries the risk of making social and cultural fault lines even more pronounced.
Reactions to the Proposal in Turkish Public Opinion
The statement has sparked a wide range of complex reactions in Turkish public opinion. Since “Turks” are not a homogeneous group, these reactions vary among Turkish citizens with nationalist, conservative, liberal, secular, or other political views. Some Turkish citizens may view the proposal positively from the following angles: segments that regard Turkish national identity as a superordinate identity transcending ethnic and sectarian differences and that consider all citizens equal may perceive this step as the state recognizing and embracing its own internal diversity. For this group, such rhetoric may reinforce the understanding that “We are all citizens of the Republic of Türkiye.” The representation of different identities at the highest echelons of the state can be supported on the grounds that it would contribute to social peace and tranquility. It may be seen as a constructive step taken to reduce long-standing tensions and to strengthen national unity. What is overlooked in this approach is that the recognition of cultural diversity in the eyes of the state would acquire a political dimension, and the result would be to serve a fragmenting rather than a consolidating function for national identity.
Some Turkish citizens may regard the increased visibility of different social segments in politics as a requirement of democracy. This can be seen as a factor that enhances the quality of democracy. It may be welcomed on the grounds that it has the potential to break certain prejudices about Kurds and Alevis. Representation at the highest level may increase these groups’ social acceptance. Those who think the state is strong and self-confident enough to implement such a proposal may interpret this step as an indicator of Türkiye’s stability and inclusiveness.
Among Turkish citizens who are particularly wedded to a traditional nationalist or unitary-state understanding, however, the proposal is viewed negatively. These segments think that Turkish national identity is being diluted with ethnic or sectarian emphases. In their view, no distinctions should be made under the superordinate identity of “Turk,” and highlighting identities in political offices in this way harms national unity. Within this segment, the idea that “being Turkish” is an integrative element that stands above identities is prevalent. Because the proposal defines identities as “separate” categories at the official level, it paves the way—among some Turks—for the perception that social fault lines are being sharpened or that a step toward division is being taken. It may be thought to conflict with the principle that “the Turkish nation is an indivisible whole.” The question “Why only Kurdish and Alevi? What about other ethnic/religious groups?” also arises. This will be interpreted as an unfair privilege that excludes other minority groups or Turks’ own sub-identities (e.g., people from the Black Sea or Aegean regions). An expectation of a merit- and achievement-based system is widespread among Turks. This proposal will be perceived as putting identity ahead of merit in political appointments, and this will draw criticism. The idea that “whoever is most suitable should be chosen; it need not be a Kurd or an Alevi” will come to the fore. Some Turkish citizens may view the proposal as lacking sincerity—a maneuver aimed at political gain. Especially if it coincides with an election period, the likelihood of it being interpreted as “vote-chasing” is high.
The proposal may lead to a number of social consequences. For example, it may trigger intense debates within Turkish society and polarization among divergent views. A renewed intellectual inquiry into the definition and boundaries of Turkish national identity will begin. The proposal’s emphasis on “strengthening brotherhood” may also be welcomed by some nationalists. In short, this statement elicits complex reactions among Turks. For some, it becomes a symbol of inclusivity and togetherness; for others, it triggers concerns about the weakening of national identity or the sharpening of fragmentation. Reactions are shaped by individuals’ own conceptions of nationalism, their political positions and their social sensibilities.
General Assessment
The statement has resonated widely in society and is leading to various outcomes. These outcomes differ depending on citizens’ existing worldviews, ethnic and religious affiliations, political leanings, and sources of information. This statement reinforces the perception of “division” and the “sharpening of difference.” These segments harbor the concern that “identities are being unnecessarily emphasized” or that “divisions are being stoked.” In their view, national identity should be inclusive and a single whole standing above ethnic or religious sub-identities. For this reason, identity-based categorizations at the highest levels of the state are perceived as “a road leading to division.” Especially for citizens who defend nationalism or the nation-state, this runs counter to traditional discourse. The proposal brings with it a questioning of merit and equality. In general, citizens find the statement “the vice president should be Kurdish or Alevi” contrary to the principle of selection based on merit. This creates the perception that the principle of meritocracy has been violated and that discrimination is being practiced. Citizens who belong to ethnic or faith groups other than Kurds or Alevis question why they are not included in such representation. This reinforces, in their cognitive world, the divide between “privileged groups” and “overlooked groups.”
The proposal also strengthens the “Us” and “Them” perception. Even some citizens who previously did not foreground their ethnic or sectarian affiliations much in everyday life cognitively render categorizations such as “we Kurds/Alevis” and “others” more salient in response to such official statements. This leads to a sense that social differences are becoming sharper and more visible.
The statement likewise brings with it a questioning of merit and equality. In general, citizens find the expression “the vice president should be Kurdish or Alevi” to be at odds with the principle of selection based on merit. Questions such as “Whoever is best should hold the post—what does identity matter?” come to mind. This leads to the perception that the principle of meritocracy has been violated and that discrimination is being practiced. Citizens who look skeptically at the manipulative aspects of politics interpret the statement as an election-oriented move, a vote-gathering tactic, or an attempt to muddle through the day. This in turn reduces trust in political actors. Citizens who belong to ethnic or faith groups other than Kurds or Alevis (for example, Laz, Circassians, Syriacs, Roma, etc.) will question why they are not included in such representation. This, in their cognitive world, strengthens the divide between “privileged groups” and “overlooked groups.”
The statement has not created a sense of inclusivity and justice in the cognitive world of the ordinary citizen; on the contrary, it has led to concern that division and differences are sharpening. The direction in which perception will develop depends largely on individuals’ existing beliefs, identities, political stances, and media reflections. If a step of this kind is not supported by a consistent, transparent, and inclusive approach aligned with the state’s general policies, negative perceptions will prevail and cause society’s fault lines to become even more cognitively pronounced. Identity- and sect-centered grand claims tied to day-to-day political interests, when they come to nothing, carry the potential in the long term to entrench destructive ideas.
