It is impossible to deny that political parties are among the phenomena that have most profoundly transformed the fundamental concepts of constitutional law and political science. For example, when examining systems of government, one cannot evaluate the workings of the parliamentary or presidential models—or compare their operation across different countries—without taking into account the organizational structures of political parties and the hierarchical relations within them. It is hardly feasible for members of the legislature, elected from party lists, to frame their relationship with the executive—headed, in all likelihood, by the leader of their own party—solely in terms of a legislature-versus-executive dichotomy, given that this same party leader holds the power to determine their political fate. Although the search for an ideal system continues through debates over electoral systems and legislation on political parties, every finding concerning parties remains critically important for all researchers in the field of politics.
In this regard, the work of French constitutional-law scholar and political scientist Maurice Duverger, who made significant contributions to both political-science and constitutional-law literature through his classifications and studies of political parties, stands as a milestone: he categorized political systems according to the number of parties. Duverger, a pioneer in party-system classification, drew the classic distinction between “single-party,” “two-party,” and “multi-party” systems.[1] Rather than counting every party that exists in political life, he based his taxonomy on the number of parties capable of seeking power and actually attaining office. After examining the political systems of many countries, he listed numerous factors that cause these systems to differ from one country to another. According to Duverger, tradition, history, religious beliefs, ethnic composition, and national rivalries are country-specific factors, whereas socio-economic, ideological, and technical factors are of a general nature. The thinker identified the electoral system—classed as a technical factor—as the most important element shaping the party system. In his view, the electoral system is itself a component of the party system. Arguing that the electoral and party systems mutually reinforce one another, he notes that proportional representation encourages a multi-party system, while a (single-round) majoritarian system fosters a two-party system, with each pair operating in a reciprocal relationship of incentives.[2]
Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori, who considered Duverger’s classification insufficiently clear and detailed, subdivided single-party, two-party and multiparty systems by also taking into account the strength of minor parties and the ideological relationships among the parties. Sartori’s classification is complex: he divided single-party systems into a true single-party system, a hegemonic single-party system and a dominant single-party system, while he classified multiparty systems as a moderate pluralist party system, an extreme pluralist party system and an atomised party system.
Since defining each of these would exceed the scope of this article and lead away from the topic, it is more useful to deal only with the categories relevant to Turkish politics.[3] Before considering those categories, it should be noted that, in forming his judgments about party systems, Sartori excluded political parties without legislative representation and devised specific criteria to include parties represented in parliament in the count. According to Sartori, to identify a party-system category based on the number of parties, one must consider the coalition potential and blackmail potential of the parties. Coalition potential refers to the likelihood that a party can become a partner in governments formed through coalitions. Blackmail potential is the capacity of opposition parties to frighten or unsettle those in power.
Sartori calls a system in which a party remains in office for longer than four legislative terms—a span he treats as the threshold—a dominant single-party system. In this system a change of government is possible and other parties do strive for office, but because one party can repeatedly win power it stands above the others. Owing to the AKP government’s having passed the four-term threshold, Türkiye may be placed in this category, whose most obvious long-standing example has been Japan. In a moderate pluralist party system, a limited number of parties hold seats in the legislature. The parties representing the extremes display ideological rigidity and show no desire to be part of government, while the power to rule is shared or alternates between two blocs situated at the centre. In this system, parties competing for centrist votes and agreeing on fundamental issues tend to cluster around those two blocs. If one assumes that in the Turkish Grand National Assembly the AKP and CHP compete for centrist votes and that the remaining parties with coalition or blackmail potential are ideological, one may likewise claim that Türkiye fits the moderate pluralist party system. Another Sartorian category that can plausibly be applied to Türkiye is the two-party system. Such systems have two defining features. First, the governing party can stay in office on its own without needing the runner-up. Second, there exists an expectation that power will alternate between the two major parties. This does not mean that only two major parties exist. Although the struggle for power occurs between two parties, other parties also play roles in political life; they simply lack the weight to influence the outcome. This makes it likely that only one of the two major parties will win the contest for power, thus rendering the system a two-party system.[4]
Although public opinion in Türkiye, during debates on the presidential and parliamentary models, often assumes that uniform systems exist worldwide and that all states simply choose between these two, it is hardly an overstatement to say that systems of government manifest differently in every country. Variations in electoral rules, party regimes and other constitutional designs give rise to dozens of distinct governmental arrangements. For example, the United Kingdom and the United States—frequently cited as classic two-party systems—are treated as ideal types of different governmental models, yet they resemble each other in the outcomes produced by their two-party frameworks; conversely, the United Kingdom and Germany, both labelled parliamentary systems in the literature, diverge markedly because of their contrasting party systems. Therefore, when analysing forms of government and the political climate they create, one must not overlook the configurations shaped by political parties.
The reason for this lengthy preface is to explore the perennial issue of who will run for the presidency—still on Türkiye’s agenda even though more than three years remain before the elections—and to consider what these candidacy debates may mean for party systems. The constitutional design produced by the 2017 amendments has yielded a sui generis arrangement in Türkiye. The so-called “Turkish-type Presidential System” features elements that depart from the defining traits of the classical presidential model, and the relationship between legislature and executive does not adhere to a strict separation of powers. Unlike a conventional presidential system, this arrangement is engineered so that, when the President and the parliamentary majority belong to the same party, the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) is devalued and weakened, whereas if they belong to different parties the system is prone to crises. Because the same alliance has twice emerged victorious from both ballot boxes that determine the legislature and the executive, the legislature—already rendered ineffectual by the nature of the system—has so far played little role in shaping either the character of the governmental structure or the essence of the party system.
Consequently, candidacy for the office of “President of the Presidential Government System,” which will be decided for the third time in the coming years, is significant because it will also determine our political party system. The hyper-pluralist party system of the 1990s and the moderate pluralist party system that could be said to have existed between 2002 and 2018 are now gone. In an atmosphere where the 2018 election was contested by four candidates and the 2023 election by three candidates[5], and where alliance models gain greater importance with every poll, including local elections, the answer to how many candidates will run in the 2028 presidential election will, if the CBHS endures, likewise give a name to the party system in our country. A scenario in which President Erdoğan—or a nominee he designates because he himself cannot stand—competes against Ekrem İmamoğlu, who will enter the main opposition party’s primary as its sole candidate, could mean that Türkiye, like the United States, becomes a two-party presidential system.[6] The presence of a third candidate who could prevent the election from being settled in the first round and, should he fall short, could wield coalition and blackmail potential with the finalists in the second round would be valuable in giving voice to the wishes and expectations of voters who cannot make themselves heard in two-candidate systems.
The fact that the person most likely to emerge as that third candidate is Mansur Yavaş could be viewed as an ironic twist of fate. Back in 2017, when Mr Yavaş urged voters to reject the constitutional-amendment referendum, the widely watched campaign video he released portrayed a voter wearing a triple-crescent badge who could not choose between the AKP and CHP candidates at the ballot box. Who knows—perhaps it will fall to him to resolve the voter’s dilemma depicted in that video. In that event, decades from now, political scientists and constitutional lawyers may well study Türkiye under the rubric of the moderate pluralist party system.
Footnotes
[1] Duverger, M. (1993). Political Parties. (Trans. Ergun Özbudun). Bilgi Publishing, pp. 278–335.
[2] Atılgan, G., & Aytekin, E. A. (2017). Political Science: Concepts, Ideologies, Interdisciplinary Relations. Yordam Books.
[3] For detailed information see: Sartori, G. (2005). Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. ECPR Press.
[4] Teziç, E. (2016). Constitutional Law. Beta Publishing, p. 413.
[5] Because Muharrem İnce withdrew a few days before the elections, the number is taken as three.
[6] It should be noted that the DEM Party’s fielding a candidate does not change the fact that, in Sartori’s typology, the system remains a two-party one.
