For a school of thought to attain continuity, it must produce a robust body of knowledge concerning truths and values. The concept of an \u201cepistemic community\u201d can be employed, in a narrow sense, to refer to the limited intellectual cadre that produces such true\u2013normative knowledge, and in a broader sense, to include the wider masses that consume and sustain it. The concept may thus be used for ideological communities that possess a shared corpus and sources of knowledge and interpretation accepted as \u201ctrue.\u201d With his distinct tones, \u0130skender Hoca (\u00d6ks\u00fcz) has been among the leading intergenerational intellectuals who have contributed to the construction of the Turkish nationalist epistemic community and who continue to nourish us.<\/p>\n
In August and September of 2025, Hoca published three essays that may be situated under the broad heading of philosophy of science (\u201cAre the Social Sciences Science?\u201d, \u201cCause and Effect, Cause and Effect,\u201d and \u201cSchr\u00f6dinger\u2019s Cat\u201d). Drawing both on our acquaintance that dates back to my undergraduate years and on Hoca\u2019s identity as a scientist, I would like to offer a few remarks on his views regarding the social sciences. I felt the need to write\u2014albeit with some delay\u2014both because the subject he addressed is professionally relevant to me and because it falls within my personal field of interest. While I was concerned that engaging critically with what he has written on science might amount to overstepping my bounds, I ultimately thought that refraining from writing, despite having something to say, would create a greater sense of dissatisfaction for Hoca.<\/p>\n
At the beginning of his second article, Hoca notes that comments were made on the first article and that discussions took place. These discussions are particularly found in the comment section beneath Hoca\u2019s piece in the Karar<\/em> newspaper. One of those commenting is another of my teachers, M\u00fcmtaz\u2019er T\u00fcrk\u00f6ne. At this point, let me share a recollection. I was still an undergraduate student in the Department of International Relations at Gazi University. It must have been around 2009. M\u00fcmtaz\u2019er Hoca had published an article in a magazine called Haber Ajanda<\/em>. There, he remarked that he found \u00d6ks\u00fcz Hoca\u2019s work \u201cT\u00fcrk Milliyet\u00e7ili\u011fi Fikir Sistemi\u201d<\/em> positivist and cold. I, too\u2014though I am not sure whether this amounted to tattling\u2014mentioned this comment to \u00d6ks\u00fcz Hoca when we encountered each other at the Milli D\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnce Merkezi. Hoca, somewhat wryly at first, responded \u201cMay God bless him,\u201d and then said that the book in question had been produced, in the conjuncture of the Cold War in T\u00fcrkiye, as an intellectual text \u201cagainst the left.\u201d After I conveyed this remark, M\u00fcmtaz\u2019er Hoca stated that he held \u0130skender Hoca in great respect, yet he did not think that the Cold War environment alone was sufficient to explain the \u201cprimitive (classical) positivism\u201d in the book. Roughly seventeen years later, witnessing almost exactly the same dialogue reproduced in public texts is, I suppose, one of the reasons that prompted me to write this piece, albeit with a delay of several months.<\/p>\n \u0130skender Hoca had also warned years ago about the distracting nature of academic work, which is the very reason for this delay. It must have been during my master\u2019s or doctoral years. On one occasion, when we spoke after I had once again fallen behind on such opinion pieces, he said, in essence, \u201cWrite more while you still have the time; once you become a professor, you will have no time at all.\u201d As a student struggling with a thesis, I had wondered how there could be a period more \u201cuncomfortable\u201d than that\u2014but Hoca was absolutely right\u2026 To return to our subject: I will try not to overwhelm the reader with overly technical terminology\u2014if I can manage it, which seems somewhat difficult given the nature of the issue. First of all, I should begin by briefly and roughly summarizing what Hoca argues in these writings (to put it in the language of science, perhaps his hypotheses):<\/p>\n I do not include Hoca\u2019s explanations of Quantum Theory in his third article within this set of claims, as I lack knowledge of the subject beyond general culture. I have not listed these points with the intention of responding to Hoca\u2019s claims one by one. Rather, I have set them out both to briefly convey the claims I will engage with to the reader and to serve as a guide for myself while writing.<\/p>\n Now let us attempt to defend the social sciences against the series of jabs delivered by \u0130skender Hoca, a natural scientist. We may begin with a simple question: Is the definition of science limited to the conditions set out by Hoca? The conception of science he advances has been described in critiques as \u201cpositivist\u201d; however, in my view, it is situated somewhere between Critical Rationalism and Positivism. In my opinion, this constitutes the central tension in Hoca\u2019s claims. While Hoca accepts determinism as a condition of what is scientific, he also adds Karl Popper\u2019s notion of falsifiability alongside it. Yet, treating determinism as a prerequisite for falsifiability is problematic. Even without entering into the \u201cproblem of meaning\u201d that distinguishes the social sciences from the natural sciences, statistical probabilities and regularities involving causality can very well fall within the scope of falsifiability. The fact that past events are being examined does not in itself render such work merely descriptive. Indeed, in the social sciences, descriptive (tasvir\u00ee) studies are often not regarded as particularly valuable. Certainly, one of the central priorities of the social sciences is the question of \u201cmeaning\u201d; however, I will refrain from entering that discussion in order to remain within the framework drawn by Hoca and to avoid unduly lengthening this piece.<\/p>\n A useful example at this point can be the \u201cDemocratic Peace Theory (DPT)\u201d in my own field of International Relations (IR). Although DPT is grounded in Immanuel Kant\u2019s argument of \u201cPerpetual Peace,\u201d it was incorporated into the IR literature in the 20th century as a data-driven and robust theory through the theoretical and empirical studies of scholars such as Michael W. Doyle, Bruce Russett, and James Lee Ray. Subsequently, a considerable body of literature has developed around this theory. In its simplest form, DPT argues, based on historical data, that \u201cthe probability of war between two democratic states is extremely low.\u201d The relevant literature further deepens, enriches, and tests this argument through examples. This statement points to a regularity in the human world and, at the same time, offers a falsifiable hypothesis. However, DPT is not deterministic, because it does not claim that war between two democracies is impossible, but rather that it is highly unlikely. In cases to the contrary, it seeks\u2014through comparisons\u2014to identify other intervening or independent variables that render the \u201cregime\u201d variable ineffective (the U.S. vs. Canada, or Denmark\u2026 Could Trump be an independent variable(!)?). In other words, the emergence of cases that appear to contradict the argument does not entirely invalidate the hypothesis. Instead, by prompting the investigation of the independent variables that cause the anomaly, it can enrich the literature and refine the hypothesis. It may be argued that the contested nature of the definitions of \u201cdemocracy\u201d and \u201cwar\u201d in the DPT literature leads to relativism. However, any given study on the subject will be bound by and tested against its own operational definitions. This probabilistic claim is empirically testable and carries a falsifiable character through systematically collected counterexamples. Yet, at this level, any single falsification based on proof cannot be regarded as a criterion for universal invalidity. This example indicates that determinism need not be a prerequisite for falsifiability.<\/p>\n Since the social sciences deal with \u201chuman action\u201d at different levels of analysis, and since human beings possess agency (agency\u2014an English term I find very useful and appealing; its exact Turkish equivalent is debatable, but I believe the word irade<\/em> comes closest), that is, they are non-deterministic beings, none of their claims can be definitively verified. It is precisely at this point that the determinism of classical positivism diverges from the notion of falsifiability in critical rationalism. Because, according to the thesis of \u201cfalsifiability,\u201d even in the natural sciences, a proposition can never be \u201cverified,\u201d but only \u201cfalsified.\u201d To give one of the most famous examples: even if you support the proposition \u201call swans are white\u201d with tens of thousands of empirical observations, the discovery of a single black swan would completely refute your proposition. Hypotheses cannot be definitively verified, because one can never be certain that a black swan will not appear one day. However, when it does appear, the hypothesis is conclusively falsified. For this reason, falsifiability posits that even the natural sciences cannot contain universal \u201ctruth\u201d and \u201ccertainty.\u201d Nevertheless, within a given period, there are propositions that are empirically supported and are the most accurate available. Or, in Thomas Kuhn\u2019s terms, there are \u201cparadigms\u201d accepted as true by the scientific community for a certain period of time.<\/p>\n If I continue from Hoca\u2019s claims, as I noted above, social science studies that incorporate probabilistic hypotheses (and I am not claiming that every social science study must necessarily contain a hypothesis) can very well propose \u201cregularities and repeatabilities\u201d as \u201cfalsifiable\u201d within certain conditions and probabilities. In this respect, they do not merely describe what has happened, but also offer predictions within a framework of certain variables and probabilities. Such hypotheses also entail a claim of causality (Cause: democratic regimes \u2192 Effect: absence of war). Moreover, causality and determinism are elements that must be distinguished from one another. If event \u201cA\u201d leads to event \u201cB,\u201d we may say that there is a causal relationship between them. If this causality occurs under clearly defined conditions at all times, then we may speak of \u201cdeterminism,\u201d which yields nomothetic (general and universal) propositions. However, not every proposition must be nomothetic. Idiographic explanations (that is, explanations of the singular and the unique) can also be the product of social scientific inquiry. \u0130skender Hoca accepts the production of nomothetic explanations as a prerequisite for something to qualify as science. But are there no idiographic explanations in the natural sciences? If the social sciences produce nomothetic explanations on a given issue, while also explaining exceptional cases in an idiographic and still causal framework, why should this not be considered \u201cscience\u201d? Or, can the production of knowledge not of the \u201cnecessary,\u201d but of the \u201cpossible\u201d (vacib\u2013m\u00fcmteni\u2013m\u00fcmkin<\/em>), not count as science?<\/p>\n Turning to the claim of scientific relativism, which is presumed to arise from the \u201cverstehen\u201d problem\u2014namely, that everyone understands the same event differently\u2014one may argue that different \u201cinterpretations\u201d are in fact tested against events and phenomena, and that some prove to be correct (to nod to Popper: the closest to the truth at that given moment), while others are shown to be incorrect. As for the argument that everyone will interpret events and phenomena according to their own \u201ctruth,\u201d such a position would not be sustainable for a scientist (unless one is a radical postmodernist!). Indeed, within the social sciences, there exists a mindset that defends extreme scientific relativism and treats the social sciences not as a means of \u201cunderstanding the world,\u201d but rather as a medium for attempting to \u201cchange\u201d phenomena in accordance with an ideal, without concern for comprehending them.<\/p>\n Setting aside certain thinkers\u2014who have also influenced my own thinking and who are labeled as such (or as post-structuralists)\u2014it would not be correct to attack the social sciences on the basis of examples from these radical\u2013extremist postmodern approaches (it is no coincidence that those who most frequently resort to the concepts of \u201cnarrative\u201d and \u201cdiscourse\u201d are of this kind), which can at times even be considered pseudoscience. Indeed, such \u201ccritical\u201d tendencies have already been sufficiently discredited through the experiments conducted by Alan Sokal (the Sokal Hoax) and later by Helen Pluckrose and her team (the Grievance Studies Affair). To understand these kinds of \u201cfashionable absurdities,\u201d I would recommend, in addition to Sokal\u2019s relevant work, Harry Frankfurt\u2019s book On Bullshit<\/em>, because one encounters studies in that body of literature that fit quite well with his definition of \u201cbullshit\u201d (to put it politely). The existence of different modes of understanding and explanation does not inevitably push the social sciences toward absolute relativism or toward mere \u201cnonsense.\u201d After all, do the natural sciences not also contain competing explanations? One might argue that, among competing explanations of the same phenomenon in the natural sciences, those that are falsified are eventually eliminated, whereas plural explanations in the social sciences persist. However, while \u201cincorrect\u201d assumptions in the social sciences may not disappear entirely, they tend to become marginalized over time and are taken less seriously. Are there not also traditions in the natural sciences that, even when marginalized, never entirely disappear?<\/p>\n The piece has become somewhat lengthy, but before concluding, I should also note that studies on quantum theory have begun to appear within the social sciences, and that there now exists a relatively new multidisciplinary field referred to as \u201cquantum social sciences.\u201d I am not an expert on the subject; however, one of the most influential figures for me within IR theory, and undoubtedly the most well-known proponent of \u201cSocial Constructivism,\u201d Alexander Wendt, has produced an important work in this field, his book Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontology<\/em> (not yet translated into Turkish), which has become a significant reference. I would in fact have liked to hear \u0130skender Hoca\u2019s views on this work or on attempts to reconcile quantum theory with the social sciences. I cannot say whether this field represents a forced effort\u2014akin to the social sciences\u2019 \u201cchildhood illness\u201d of imitating the natural sciences under classical positivism\u2014or whether it carries the potential to open new horizons in the social sciences. As of February 2026, it appears to have received around 1,000 citations on Google Scholar. Considering that it was written in 2015 by an author such as Wendt and that it is one of the relatively few books in the field, it does not yet seem to have attracted a very high level of scientific interest. This is especially evident when compared to his 1999 book Social Theory of International Politics<\/em>, which has received around 20,000 citations.<\/p>\n To sum up; as a social scientist who does not practice his profession merely to earn a livelihood, I wished to write a defense of our field as a modest rejoinder to the views of our esteemed master and one of our intellectual pioneers, \u0130skender \u00d6ks\u00fcz Hoca. Hoca\u2019s concern stems from the inability of the social sciences to produce predictions with certainty and from their tendency to continually introduce new interpretations to account for differing outcomes. This concern is not without foundation. Indeed, in the social sciences, theories often preserve their explanatory power by stretching themselves and resorting to interpretation. However, to conclude from this that \u201cthe social sciences cannot be considered science\u201d would be an overly rigid generalization. In the social sciences, alongside the concern with meaning, there are also serious empirical research efforts, data analyses, and falsifiable hypotheses. At times, this effort to resemble the natural sciences reaches such a level that I recall, when I first picked up and browsed the American Political Science Review<\/em>, feeling the need to check whether it was in fact a mathematics journal. In my view, the problem does not lie in the nature of the social sciences as such. Criticizing the social sciences on the basis of radical postmodern approaches and studies characterized by extreme relativism does not seem particularly sound to me. For a flawed example does not constitute a precedent. Given that it deals with a world that is unpredictable and complex\u2014arising from human action\u2014it seems necessary to approach this field with a degree of tolerance. One must also add that any debate over what counts as science will itself, in one respect, fall within the domain of the \u201cverstehen\u201d problem and therefore cannot produce a universal and absolute conclusion. For the very dispute over how science should be defined\u2014much to Hoca\u2019s likely disapproval\u2014inevitably contains elements of subjectivity and relativism.<\/p>\n Juan Jos\u00e9 Linz, the late political scientist who once taught at Yale, where Hoca also spent a period, said in an interview about our profession: \u201cI am learning things, and I am fortunate that society pays me for something I enjoy.\u201d Indeed, the social sciences are, to some extent, an activity we pursue for pleasure. For my own part, to such an extent that I recently realized that, as the boundaries between hobby and profession have blurred and disappeared, I do little other than engage in social science (apart from administrative professional chores). I do not ordinarily take pleasure in clich\u00e9s, but this has become a way of life. I know that many of my colleagues in the social sciences share the same condition and sentiment. From this perspective, defending the social sciences also amounts, in a sense, to defending the meaningfulness of our own lives; hence, we may approach the issue with a degree of emotion. To the extent of my intellectual capacity and writing ability, and as concisely as possible, I have attempted to offer a defense against Hoca\u2019s comments and critiques. I hope that it proves useful and finds its proper place.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" For a school of thought to attain continuity, it must produce a robust body of knowledge concerning truths and values.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":25,"featured_media":1693,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[23],"tags":[452,451,449,450,448],"ppma_author":[254],"class_list":["post-1692","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-politics","tag-democratic-peace-theory","tag-international-relations","tag-philosophy-of-science","tag-positivism","tag-social-sciences"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"authors":[{"term_id":254,"user_id":25,"is_guest":0,"slug":"mustafa-onur-tetik","display_name":"Assoc. 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\n\u2022 For a knowledge-producing activity to be genuinely regarded as scientific, it must advance hypotheses, and these hypotheses must be testable and falsifiable.
\n\u2022 If a narrative or argumentation does not contain \u201ccausality (cause\u2013effect relations)\u201d and\/or \u201cdeterminism\u201d (although Hoca, at the very beginning of the first article, presents these as if they were interchangeable concepts, I believe there are notable differences), then we cannot speak of a scientific activity or product.
\n\u2022 The absence of deterministic certainties in the social sciences, and the existence of various forms of \u201cverstehen (understanding? \u2013 grasping through interpretation)\u201d on the same issues, reduces the arguments therein to the level of \u201cnarratives.\u201d
\n\u2022 There is no \u201cdeterminism\u201d in the social sciences; therefore, there is no \u201cfalsifiability.\u201d Where there is no falsifiability, there is no science.
\n\u2022 The \u201cuncertainty\u201d in the social sciences is of a fundamentally different nature from that in quantum theory.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n