The long-standing political crisis in Venezuela has entered a new phase following a foreign intervention carried out by the United States and the arrest of [deposed] President Nicolas Maduro on charges of narco-terrorism, after which he was brought to the United States. This intervention, which developed against the 25-year \u201cChavismo\u201d regime, has not only changed a government but has also constituted a moment of rupture that has shifted the balance of global politics. The United States is now facing a \u201cday after\u201d test. In a state structure where political institutions have been rendered dysfunctional for a quarter of a century and power has been concentrated in a single center, it remains highly uncertain whether the Venezuelan opposition will be able to govern the country effectively and re-establish institutional order.<\/p>\n
The Significance of the Intervention for World Politics<\/strong><\/p>\n The United States carried out a similar intervention in Panama at the end of 1989; it arrested the then Panamanian military leader Manuel Noriega and brought him to the United States on January 3, 1990\u2014exactly 36 years before Maduro\u2019s arrest\u2014so that he could be tried on narcotics-related charges. Therefore, the intervention in Venezuela has an important historical precedent in that the United States, without pursuing any international legal avenue, apprehended a foreign head of state in his own country and removed him to stand trial in the United States.<\/p>\n However, shortly before the Panama operation, the Panamanian Assembly had declared war on the United States, and Panamanian soldiers had killed a U.S. officer stationed in the country. Moreover, the intervention took place at a time when it had become certain that the Cold War would conclude with a U.S. victory, and no other great power threat to U.S. hegemony was visible in the short term (unipolar moment). In more recent interventions\u2014such as those in Iraq, Libya, and Yugoslavia, which have been frequently referenced following the Venezuela intervention\u2014the United States, despite heavily manipulating international public opinion, still sought a basis of international legitimacy by relying on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions or the doctrine of \u201cResponsibility to Protect\u201d (R2P).<\/p>\n Therefore, the intervention in Venezuela constitutes a turning point for contemporary international politics in that it was carried out unilaterally and without an explicit provocation (unprovoked)\u2014such as an attack on military personnel and\/or a declaration of war\u2014at a time when great power competition continues in a multipolar structure and the legal legitimacy of international interventions is frequently contested.<\/p>\n In this respect, the intervention has demonstrated that the notion of a \u201crules-based international order,\u201d whose effectiveness has long been debated, no longer retains practical validity\u2014at least for the present day. Instead, the understanding that \u201cmight makes right\u201d has been reinforced. This situation has, in turn, created a basis of legitimacy for other great powers and middle powers to pursue interventions aligned with their own agendas. In this context, perceptions of international insecurity, as well as tendencies toward armament and\/or balancing, are expected to intensify in the period ahead.<\/p>\n This move by the United States represents the practical implementation of the policy referred to as the \u201cTrump Corollary,\u201d which is widely discussed in recent U.S. foreign policy circles and considered an updated version of the Monroe Doctrine [1]. This strategy envisions the consolidation of the United States\u2019 energy and security architecture from northern Canada to the Tierra del Fuego archipelago at the southern tip of South America.<\/p>\n In this context, it should be expected that the tensions previously observed along the Greenland, Canada, Mexico, and Panama axis during the early days of the Trump administration will be reignited in the near future. At the same time, interpreting the intervention in Venezuela as a policy of continental consolidation by the Trump administration will likely push other great powers and regional powers to adopt more assertive and determined policies within the geographies they consider to be their own spheres of influence.<\/p>\n China is the world\u2019s largest oil importer, with daily imports exceeding 11 million barrels. More than 70% of China\u2019s total oil consumption is met through imports. Although official figures suggest lower levels, when accounting for methods used to circumvent sanctions\u2014such as the so-called \u201cMalaysia blend\u201d\u2014the discounted\/sanctioned oil supplied to China from the Iran\u2013Russia\u2013Venezuela trio constitutes approximately 41% of its total imports and nearly 30% of its overall oil demand.<\/p>\n Recent data indicate that, shortly before the U.S. intervention, approximately 80% of Venezuela\u2019s total oil exports were being directed to China either directly or indirectly, and that Venezuela alone accounted for roughly 6% of China\u2019s total oil imports [2]. Venezuela holds more than 18% of the world\u2019s proven oil reserves, making it the country with the largest oil reserves globally. However, due to infrastructural deficiencies and sanctions, its share in global oil production remains at only around 1.3% [3]. Despite this underutilized potential, deep structural deficiencies in energy infrastructure make it difficult to extract Venezuelan oil profitably in the short term. Nevertheless, the scale of its reserves\u2014sufficient on their own to meet approximately nine years of global oil demand\u2014renders Venezuela an untapped and strategically indispensable long-term natural resource power.<\/p>\n By orchestrating regime change in Venezuela, the United States has effectively shut off one of China\u2019s most critical sources of cheap, local-currency-denominated oil supply. At a time when Moscow and Tehran are already constrained by wars, political crises, and sanctions, the change of government in Caracas has further increased the fragility of China\u2019s energy security, given its structural dependence on external energy sources. Therefore, while the intervention may encourage China to pursue more assertive policies within regions it considers its sphere of influence, the United States has gained a strategic advantage in the competition by exacerbating China\u2019s energy vulnerabilities.<\/p>\n Moreover, China has limited itself to observing the U.S. intervention and has refrained from issuing strong criticism in its aftermath. Beijing\u2019s inability to protect a key commercial and strategic partner against U.S. intervention is likely to undermine its image as an \u201calternative power\u201d to the Western bloc in the eyes of \u201cGlobal South\u201d countries\u2014many of which are located in Latin America and Africa.<\/p>\n Through its intervention in Venezuela, the United States has sent a message of resolve against the search for an \u201calternative financial architecture,\u201d which began with Russia\u2019s exclusion from the SWIFT system following its invasion of Ukraine and accelerated with China\u2019s efforts to establish alternative payment systems and currencies across BRICS. However, this use of \u201chard power\u201d is likely, in the long term, to push countries in various regions of the world toward a more determined pursuit of de-dollarization.<\/p>\n The U.S. intervention in Venezuela has also demonstrated the scale and scope of actions that great powers may undertake within the context of competition over critical minerals. With the Venezuela intervention, this competition has entered a more intense and potentially more violent phase. In this context, geopolitical tensions surrounding critical minerals are expected to escalate further in the coming period.<\/p>\n The Significance of the Intervention for T\u00fcrkiye<\/strong><\/p>\n The Limits of the \u201cHedging\u201d Policy Have Become Apparent: The \u201ccall for restraint by all parties\u201d issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to the overthrow of a government that had previously been hosted at the level of head of state and with which strong bilateral relations had consistently been emphasized is striking in that it demonstrates Ankara\u2019s preference for a low-profile and cautious approach in the Venezuela file. This stance indicates that T\u00fcrkiye has, if not formally abandoned, at least de facto suspended its long-standing \u201cmulti-dimensional foreign policy\u201d discourse\u2014adopted under the shadow of issues such as the procurement of F-16s and F-35s, the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, political stabilization in Syria, and domestic economic normalization\u2014and has instead prioritized its relations with the United States. Ankara\u2019s preference for caution in the Venezuela intervention reflects the emergence of a new constraint in Turkish foreign policy.<\/p>\n A Credibility Problem: Ankara\u2019s muted response to the intervention in Venezuela is likely to undermine T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s image as a proponent of a \u201cjust world\u201d and as an \u201calternative ally,\u201d which it has sought to build in recent years across Africa and Latin America. The perception that T\u00fcrkiye may not stand by its partners in times of difficulty and\/or may step back when its interests clash with those of the United States is likely to result in a loss of trust along a wide arc of cooperation extending from Russia to Somalia.<\/p>\n Old Accounts, New Costs: The trade volume between T\u00fcrkiye and Venezuela approached approximately 600 million USD annually in the 2023\u20132024 period [5], and the leaders of the two countries had set a target of three billion USD per year. Existing commercial relations\u2014such as those developed by Turkish construction and mining companies in the region, as well as mechanisms like \u201cfood-for-gold\u201d [6]\u2014risk being recharacterized by the new regime as \u201ccomplicity with the former regime\u201d and potentially instrumentalized against T\u00fcrkiye in international public opinion. Allegations that may be raised in relation to these ties, similar to the Halkbank case, could affect not only T\u00fcrkiye\u2013Venezuela relations but also T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s relations with the United States.<\/p>\n Regional Competition with Russia and Israel: As a consequence of the United States\u2019 focus on the Western Hemisphere, regional actors are likely to seek to fill emerging power vacuums in the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Eastern Europe. In this context, T\u00fcrkiye will have to confront the moves of actors\u2014particularly Russia and Israel\u2014in a much harsher competitive environment, in the absence of U.S. mediation, prevention, and deterrence mechanisms.<\/p>\n Policy Recommendations<\/strong><\/p>\n The fall of the 25-year \u201cChavismo\u201d regime in Venezuela as a result of U.S. intervention represents not merely a change of government but a moment of rupture in global politics. The intervention has strategically increased both uncertainties and vulnerabilities for Turkish foreign policy, both in terms of great power competition and regional dynamics within T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s adjacent geography. In this context, the policies to be pursued may be summarized as follows:<\/p>\n References<\/strong><\/p>\n [1]\u00a0https:\/\/english.elpais.com\/usa\/2025-12-08\/the-us-plan-for-latin-america-the-monroe-doctrine-returns-reinterpreted-by-trump.html<\/a><\/p>\n [2]\u00a0https:\/\/www.eia.gov\/todayinenergy\/detail.php?id=64544<\/a><\/p>\n [3]\u00a0https:\/\/www.statista.com\/chart\/16830\/countries-with-the-largest-proven-crude-oil-reserves\/<\/a><\/p>\n [4]\u00a0https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/illegal-mining-venezuela-death-and-devastation-amazonas-and-orinoco-regions<\/a><\/p>\n [5]\u00a0https:\/\/data.tuik.gov.tr\/Bulten\/Index?p=Dis-Ticaret-Istatistikleri-Kasim-2025-53908<\/a><\/p>\n\n
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