The dynamism and diligence of CHP Chairperson Mr. \u00d6zg\u00fcr are well known. His loyalty and friendship after the tragic loss in Manisa also revealed, in the most genuine way, the strength of his human side. Yet, despite all these positive traits, I can say that the energy that had peaked last March \u2014 with CHP at its center \u2014 has since significantly dissipated. This decline owes much to the routinization of rallies and the party\u2019s ideological positioning during the \u201copening process.\u201d It could be said that in prolonged processes, reactions inevitably become routine \u2014 and that is largely true.<\/p>\n
Over time, actions become ordinary, and the more ordinary they become, the less effective they are. That is why, in such processes, taking bold, result-oriented action early on is often the most accurate choice. CHP chose not to do that. Evidently, Mr. Ekrem embraced this same approach. Perhaps even despite that choice, social opposition could have been broadened and kept alive. In truth, the ground was very fertile for it. Yet at that juncture, the CHP elites made an ideological choice. At the very beginning of the process, during a meeting with NGOs in Diyarbak\u0131r, Mr. \u00d6zg\u00fcr expressed his preference explicitly as follows: \u201cUnder today\u2019s conditions, we could gain political advantage or votes by positioning ourselves against the government. But we want to stand on the right side of history. Even if our vote share does not increase, history will record that CHP took the right stance in this brotherhood project.\u201d [1] This choice was flawed in two fundamental respects. First, while CHP had built its opposition on the claim that the AK Party\u2013MHP alliance was incapable of solving Turkey\u2019s problems in justice, education, agriculture, or inflation, it now adopted a new stance implying that the country\u2019s most intricate issue could, in fact, be solved with the current government. The second mistake was that the party elites \u2014 who zealously invoke the titles of \u201cthe founding party of the Republic\u201d and \u201cAtat\u00fcrk\u2019s party\u201d \u2014 made a choice utterly incompatible with both their electorate and the party\u2019s historical identity. In fact, what appear to be two separate errors in this new positioning may well be united under the umbrella of the second. That is to say, if one defines the CHP elites\u2019 decision to grant the government a credit they had denied it in every other matter as a mere tactical misstep, that would be incomplete. Considering the ideological motivation behind it, it is not a \u201cmistake\u201d but a political preference<\/em> \u2014 in which case the two mistakes merge into one grand ideological choice. And that ideological choice \u2014 made by CHP elites despite their own voters and history \u2014 is precisely the subject of this article. Let me explain how.<\/p>\n We now have a new study in hand \u2014 one I trust completely, as I personally took part in its design, implementation, and analysis. It is titled The Nationalism Map of Turkey<\/em> by T\u00c7E.[2] This study was carried out with great breadth and detail to capture the MRI, so to speak, of the country\u2019s nationalist tones and textures. In many respects, it is the first of its kind. Thanks to this research, we can observe the tendencies, orientations, and preferences of both the nation at large and the voters of each party on a wide range of issues. One of the most striking findings in the analysis was the sharp divide between two groups within CHP\u2019s electorate. As is known, CHP is a long-established political structure that defines itself with the titles \u201cKemalist\u201d and \u201cSocial Democrat.\u201d The first of these identifiers \u2014 Kemalism \u2014 also happens to be the most common political orientation in Turkey. About 34.2% of the population describe themselves as Kemalists. The share of those who identify as social democrats, on the other hand, remains limited to 4.9%. So what picture emerges when we look specifically at those who voted for CHP in the last general election? A balance of equal strength between the two? Not even close. Among Kemalists nationwide, 57.8% voted for CHP in the last election. This means that of CHP\u2019s 25.8% total vote share, 19.4 percentage points came directly from Kemalists. Meanwhile, among the 4.9% of the country who identify as social democrats, 42.4% voted for CHP. In numerical terms, their contribution to CHP\u2019s 25.8% total is only about 2 percentage points. Additionally, among the 25.4% of Turkish citizens who identify as Turkish nationalists, 15.4% are CHP voters \u2014 translating to a 3.8-point contribution. In other words, within CHP\u2019s electorate, those who call themselves Turkish nationalists outnumber social democrats by nearly two to one. To clarify: 89.9% of CHP voters identify themselves as either Kemalist or Turkish nationalist. Only 7.7% of CHP\u2019s voters define themselves as social democrats.<\/p>\n Of course, this does not mean that there are no Kemalists within CHP who lean toward social democracy, or vice versa. Nevertheless, it shows that differences in political self-identification \u2014 even within the same party \u2014 lead to significant internal fractures. For example, in response to the question \u201cHow nationalist do you consider yourself?\u201d, 73% of CHP voters described themselves as \u201cvery nationalist\u201d or \u201cnationalist.\u201d This figure, within the margin of error, aligns with the national average. Among Kemalists, the rate of those declaring themselves nationalist is 77.3%. Among social democrats, however, it drops to 48.7% \u2014 a stark gap of nearly 30 points. A similar divergence appears in other areas as well. To the question \u201cDo you agree with the statement \u2018Everyone who is a citizen of the Republic of Turkey is a Turk\u2019?\u201d, 74.7% of CHP voters said \u201cyes.\u201d Among Kemalists \u2014 the country\u2019s largest ideological group \u2014 84.2% agreed. Among social democrats, the \u201cyes\u201d rate falls to 55.4%, again showing a nearly 30-point difference. Likewise, when asked whether \u201cThe constitutional definition of citizenship should be amended to include different ethnic groups,\u201d 63.5% of CHP voters said they disagreed. Among Kemalists, 65.3% opposed such a change. Among social democrats, however, the ratio was precisely the opposite: 63.5% agreed, and only 36.5% disagreed.<\/p>\n Only 38.2% of CHP voters agree with the statement \u201cElective Kurdish courses should be offered in every school.\u201d Among AK Party voters, the rate is 46.9%. Among Kemalists, 34.5% support this view. In contrast, 75.4% of social democrats favor the introduction of elective Kurdish courses in schools. On this question, the gap between Kemalists and social democrats exceeds 40 points.A very similar divergence appears regarding the question of Kurdish-language services in public institutions. Among social democrats, 70.2% support the provision of such services, while among Kemalists, 71.5% oppose it. When asked \u201cDo you think Kurds are treated as equal citizens?\u201d, 64.1% of CHP voters \u2014 consistent with the national average \u2014 answered \u201cyes,\u201d while 69.8% of social democrats said, \u201cno, they are not treated equally.\u201d<\/p>\n To the question \u201cShould \u00d6calan be released?\u201d, 87.8% of respondents nationwide said \u201cno.\u201d Among CHP voters, opposition to \u00d6calan\u2019s release is even stronger at 93.5%, and among Kemalists, it rises slightly to 95.1%. Among social democrats, however, opposition drops to 69.8% \u2014 once again revealing a large and familiar gap. At this point, it is worth noting: CHP is by far the first-choice party of Kemalists. It is also the leading choice among social democrats \u2014 but not by a large margin. While 42.4% of social democrats vote for CHP, 38.6% support the DEM Party. In other words, of the 2-point share of social democrat voters within CHP\u2019s overall vote, roughly the same proportion also belongs to the DEM Party electorate. A significant segment of DEM voters who align with national trends on certain issues are these \u201cDEM social democrats.\u201d Similarly, within CHP, those who show alignment with DEM Party positions are largely its social democratic members. Together, the social democratic voters of both parties make up roughly 4 percentage points of the national electorate.<\/p>\n Given that 89.9% of CHP voters identify themselves as Kemalist or nationalist, it seems clear that the party elites\u2019 adoption of a critical political stance that only 7.7% of their electorate would support has dampened the energy of social opposition \u2014 demoralizing the activist, Kemalist, and nationalist youth who had dominated the streets after March 19.<\/p>\n I am also of the opinion that there is a significant gap between the ideological distribution at CHP\u2019s grassroots and that at its upper echelons. While Kemalists vastly outnumber social democrats at the base, the balance among the party\u2019s elites has tilted in favor of social democrats and at the expense of Kemalists. This ideological divergence between the base and the leadership, I would argue, is the main reason the party\u2019s energy remains far below its potential.<\/p>\n If the party elites do not make a radical change in this ideologically risky course that distances them from their base, it would not be surprising to see the real cost of that choice revealed in the next election.<\/p>\n Footnotes<\/strong><\/p>\n [1] \u201cThree Different Figures Sending a Message of Not Giving Up on Peace Despite Terror: Bah\u00e7eli, Demirta\u015f, \u00d6zel\u2026\u201d, https:\/\/t24.com.tr\/yazarlar\/murat-sabuncu\/terore-ragmen-barisin-pesini-birakmama-mesaji-veren-uc-farkli-isim-bahceli-demirtas-ozel,46915<\/a><\/p>\n