The 80th United Nations (UN) General Assembly, which brought together world leaders in New York, had one indisputable focal point: the Palestinian question and the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Gaza. In numerous speeches delivered at the General Assembly, calls were made for either the deployment of a peacekeeping force to Gaza or for a humanitarian intervention. The fact that the concept of \u201chumanitarian intervention\u201d has, perhaps for the first time, been raised so explicitly in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict \u2014 and during the UN General Assembly itself \u2014 inevitably directs attention to the only institution that could, in principle, take a decision consistent with international law: the UN. It is an institution that has served as both the birthplace and the graveyard of this very concept. This article, by examining the UN\u2019s record from Rwanda to Kosovo, from Srebrenica to Libya, seeks to reveal why the UN\u2019s historical and institutional design has rendered it systematically inadequate in the face of crises such as Gaza \u2014 and what this inadequacy implies for the future of the international order.<\/p>\n
The United Nations, much like its predecessor the League of Nations, was founded by the victorious powers of a world war under the stated mission of \u201cmaintaining international peace and security,\u201d yet in practice to preserve an order largely shaped around their own interests. The principle of collective security, which forms the cornerstone of the UN Charter, theoretically envisions that all members of the system act jointly against any act of aggression. However, this liberal-internationalist ideal was constrained from the very outset by a realist truth: the oligarchic structure of the Security Council and the veto power granted to its five permanent members (P5). The United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and China are the permanent members of the Security Council \u2014 the UN\u2019s most powerful organ \u2014 each endowed with unilateral veto authority. This mechanism has produced a persistent tension between Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which enshrines respect for state sovereignty, and Chapter VII, which regulates coercive measures against threats to peace. As a result, the implementation of the collective security principle has become dependent on the geopolitical interests of the P5 states.<\/p>\n
The structure of the Security Council, which has repeatedly paralyzed the organization\u2019s peacekeeping mission, manifested itself clearly in numerous instances during the Cold War. Throughout that period, the UN could act against acts of aggression only when \u201cboth superpowers agreed\u201d or when one of them \u201cremained indifferent.\u201d The UN\u2019s involvement in the Korean War was possible only under an exceptional circumstance \u2014 when the Soviet Union was boycotting both the Council and the General Assembly. The 1950 General Assembly Resolution 377, titled \u201cUniting for Peace,\u201d was an American-led initiative to transfer authority to the General Assembly in order to bypass the Soviet veto; yet, in an ironic twist, it was first invoked in 1956 during the Suez Crisis against two of the permanent members themselves \u2014 the United Kingdom and France \u2014 who were in the role of aggressors. In that 1956 crisis, the relative effectiveness of UN actions depended largely on the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union opposed the invasion of Suez. During the same period, however, similar General Assembly initiatives in response to the Soviet invasion of Hungary produced no tangible outcome \u2014 confirming that the system\u2019s effectiveness depended entirely on the consent, or at least the indifference, of the great powers. These examples revealed that the UN could only be \u201ceffective\u201d to the extent permitted by those powers. The more tragic examples would come after the Cold War.<\/p>\n
The Bloody Legacy of Rwanda and Srebrenica<\/strong><\/p>\n With the end of the Cold War, new hopes began to blossom for the United Nations. It was believed that, freed from bipolar rivalry, the Security Council would no longer be paralyzed and that the organization could assume a more active role on behalf of humanity. At the same time, the proliferation of internal conflicts and grave human rights violations across different regions and countries placed such crises at the center of the international agenda, forcing a reinterpretation of the principle of state sovereignty. During this period, the concept of humanitarian intervention<\/em> gained prominence as a new international norm \u2014 grounded in the idea that sovereignty is not absolute, and that when a state commits crimes against its own people, the international community has not only the right but also the responsibility to intervene.<\/p>\n The notion that the international community bears a duty to act in the face of genocide, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing gave rise to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention<\/em> and, ultimately, to the norm known as the Responsibility to Protect<\/em> (R2P), formally endorsed at the 2005 World Summit. Initially articulated in concrete terms by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in its 2001 report The Responsibility to Protect<\/em>, the R2P rests upon two fundamental principles: first, that every state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; and second, that when a state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, it passes to the international community. Endorsed in principle by UN member states at the 2005 World Summit, R2P became the most significant normative development aimed at legitimizing humanitarian intervention.<\/p>\n Despite the theoretical elegance of R2P, its practical implementation once again exposed the structural weaknesses of the UN system. The most painful examples of these weaknesses occurred in the very decade during which the R2P norm was taking shape \u2014 the 1990s. The 1994 Rwandan Genocide stands as the most tragic violation of the vow \u201cnever again.\u201d The colonial legacy that had entrenched divisions between the country\u2019s two major ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi, culminated in an ethnic war that claimed the lives of nearly 800,000 people within just three months.<\/p>\n Although General Rom\u00e9o Dallaire, commander of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), warned that he could stop the genocide with a strengthened mandate and additional equipment, the Security Council took the opposite course \u2014 reducing troop numbers on the ground. The underlying reason for this decision was that Western powers, led by the Clinton administration in the United States, saw no vital \u201cnational interest\u201d in the region and, scarred by the losses suffered in Somalia, were reluctant to engage in another peacekeeping operation in Africa. Years later, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan would candidly acknowledge this failure: \u201cWe will not deny that, at the moment they most needed us, the world abandoned the people of Rwanda.\u201d<\/p>\n A year later, in 1995, in the heart of Europe \u2014 in Srebrenica, a UN-declared \u201csafe area\u201d under the protection of peacekeeping forces \u2014 more than eight thousand Bosniak civilians were massacred, turning the tragedy into a symbol of the UN\u2019s operational impotence. One of the main causes of this catastrophe was the decision taken under U.S. President George H. W. Bush that \u201cunder no circumstances would American ground troops be used in Bosnia.\u201d Without its own standing army and dependent on the voluntary contributions of member states, the UN was rendered powerless in the face of its most powerful member\u2019s reluctance. The image of the UN \u201cpleading for military assistance\u201d<\/em> from NATO to enforce its resolutions starkly illustrated how far the organization had drifted from being an autonomous actor.<\/p>\n Both Rwanda and Srebrenica revealed, in the most devastating way, that the legitimacy and effectiveness of humanitarian intervention remained deeply contingent on the strategic calculations of the P5 powers.<\/p>\n Somalia, Kosovo and Libya: Interest-Driven Humanitarian Interventions<\/strong><\/p>\n The problems in the UN\u2019s record of interventions are not limited to inaction. Even in cases where the organization has managed to trigger meaningful action, the selectivity of those responses and the motivations behind them have raised serious doubts about its impartiality and legitimacy. The humanitarian crisis in Somalia and the subsequent UN intervention in 1992 were, to a large extent, products of the Cold War\u2013era strategic rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union over the oil routes of the Persian Gulf. Despite rampant corruption, U.S. support for the Siad Barre regime accelerated the collapse of the Somali state. Although the 1992 UN intervention was justified on humanitarian grounds, it was widely criticized as a delayed and interest-driven reaction to a crisis rooted in great-power politics.<\/p>\n The 1999 humanitarian intervention in Kosovo marked a turning point for the UN\u2019s authority. Knowing that Russia would almost certainly veto any resolution, NATO completely bypassed the Security Council and carried out air operations against Yugoslavia. This intervention, while defended on the grounds that it may have prevented mass atrocities, simultaneously dealt a heavy blow to the UN system by excluding the Security Council\u2014the only body empowered under international law to legitimize the use of force. The episode demonstrated that \u201chumanitarian intervention\u201d could also be executed independently by powerful states or alliances outside the UN framework.<\/p>\n In 2011, the NATO operation in Libya\u2014authorized by the UN Security Council under Resolution 1973\u2014was launched under the stated purpose of \u201cprotecting civilians.\u201d However, what began as a civilian-protection mandate quickly evolved into a mission for regime change, confirming critical perspectives that the Responsibility to Protect<\/em> (R2P) doctrine could be instrumentalized by hegemonic powers to advance their own geopolitical agendas. Libya\u2019s vast oil reserves further reinforced the perception that these \u201chumanitarian\u201d motives were outweighed by economic and strategic interests. This episode justified the concern that the R2P doctrine could become a tool for powerful states to pursue interventions aligned with their own objectives.<\/p>\n This historical analysis reveals that the UN is fundamentally afflicted by a contradiction between the universal and normative ideals embodied in its founding charter and the power-political structure of the Security Council. The organization\u2019s effectiveness and legitimacy remain perpetually hostage to the national interests of its permanent members. This reality reflects not only the structural deformities built into the UN\u2019s institutional organs since its inception but also a wider crisis of representation and legitimacy that fails to respond to the dynamics of today\u2019s international system.<\/p>\n To understand why a humanitarian intervention in Gaza has not been possible, one must examine the political balance within the Security Council. Israel\u2019s unconditional support from the United States ensures that any attempt to authorize such an intervention would face a U.S. veto from the outset. The United States considers Israel\u2019s security an inseparable component of its own national interests, while France and the United Kingdom generally prefer to align with Washington\u2019s position. Russia and China, on the other hand, view the Western rhetoric of \u201chumanitarian intervention\u201d as a vehicle for imposing Western interests, and thus tend to preserve the status quo rather than offer principled support. This configuration explains not only why a humanitarian intervention in Gaza is impossible, but also why the Security Council itself has become paralyzed in deep political deadlock.<\/p>\n In theory, an alternative path might exist: individual states could organize under the \u201cUniting for Peace\u201d mechanism to mobilize the General Assembly and adopt a resolution in favor of intervention in Gaza. Numerically, such a resolution could pass. Yet in operational terms, there is no political or military actor capable of carrying it out. Protected by a security umbrella and unconditional U.S. material support, Israel remains effectively shielded by the international system despite engaging in actions contrary to international law.<\/p>\n Throughout the 80th UN General Assembly, speeches calling for a peacekeeping mission or humanitarian intervention in Gaza have remained overshadowed by the structural problems that have plagued the UN since its creation. Within the current geopolitical context, the adoption of any meaningful or coercive resolution by the Security Council is virtually impossible by the very nature of the system. The veto mechanism and deep divisions among the permanent members continue to be the greatest obstacles to any effective, law-based, and enforceable international solution for Gaza.<\/p>\n Unless a comprehensive reform of the Security Council is undertaken, the UN cannot be expected to act as an effective actor in crises such as Gaza. The political barriers that obstruct such reform condemn countries\u2014particularly in regions like the Middle East, where the principles of international humanitarian law are increasingly powerless before raw political might\u2014to an uncertain and fragile future.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The 80th United Nations (UN) General Assembly, which brought together world leaders in New York, had one indisputable focal point: the Palestinian question and the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Gaza.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":21,"featured_media":1614,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[26],"tags":[382,383,273,381,384,380],"ppma_author":[186],"class_list":["post-1613","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-foreign-policy","tag-gaza","tag-kosovo","tag-libya","tag-palestine","tag-somalia","tag-united-nations"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"authors":[{"term_id":186,"user_id":21,"is_guest":0,"slug":"bercin-yigitaslan","display_name":"Ber\u00e7in Yi\u011fitaslan","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/Bercin-Yigitaslan.jpg","url2x":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/Bercin-Yigitaslan.jpg"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1613","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/21"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1613"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1613\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1615,"href":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1613\/revisions\/1615"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1614"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1613"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1613"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1613"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=1613"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}