{"id":1554,"date":"2025-07-25T22:52:50","date_gmt":"2025-07-25T19:52:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/?p=1554"},"modified":"2025-08-02T01:58:13","modified_gmt":"2025-08-01T22:58:13","slug":"the-sound-of-the-fire-engine-in-my-ears-in-turkiye-its-not-just-fires-burning-its-the-public-service-system","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.toplum.org.tr\/en\/the-sound-of-the-fire-engine-in-my-ears-in-turkiye-its-not-just-fires-burning-its-the-public-service-system\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cThe Sound of the Fire Engine in My Ears\u2026\u201d: In T\u00fcrkiye, It\u2019s Not Just Fires Burning\u2014It\u2019s the Public Service System"},"content":{"rendered":"

The sound of the fire engine lingers in my ears\u2026 I\u2019m in Eski\u015fehir. The piercing sirens blend into the howling of the wind. Another plume of smoke rises from the heart of Anatolia. But this fire is consuming more than just trees, forests, and living creatures\u2014it is also scorching the delayed reflexes of public administration, the tangled chains of authority, and the fragmented service models.<\/p>\n

The year 2025 is not being remembered for its fires, but for its failures. Over 80,000 hectares have been reduced to ash, and thousands of living beings have perished. One of the most tragic examples took place in Seyitgazi. Five forest workers and five AKUT volunteers\u2014first responders to the blaze\u2014paid with their lives for the shortcomings of the system. The truth is this: in T\u00fcrkiye, it is no longer only the forests that are burning, but the public services themselves.<\/p>\n

Even a few months\u2019 worth of data lays bare the reality: in the first six months of 2025 alone, 1,295 forest fires were officially recorded. In just one week\u2014from the end of June to the beginning of July\u201426,260 hectares of forest land burned in \u0130zmir alone (tr.wikipedia.org, 2025). When we consider that between 1937 and 2024, a total of 126,268 fires occurred in T\u00fcrkiye, destroying around 1.9 million hectares of land, it becomes clear that 2025 far exceeds historical averages in both frequency and scale.<\/p>\n

Although T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s technical capacity for firefighting seems to expand year by year, this growth does not fully align with the realities on the ground. As of 2025, the country\u2019s aerial fleet includes 27 firefighting planes, 105 helicopters, and 14 unmanned aerial vehicles. These are deployed both for suppression and surveillance purposes. According to statements from the General Directorate of Forestry, the average response time for initial intervention has dropped to 11 minutes. However, in rural areas, this timeframe often extends significantly\u2014a fact repeatedly confirmed by numerous incidents.<\/p>\n

On the ground, there are currently 1,786 water tenders, 2,742 first-response vehicles, 831 heavy-duty machines, and approximately 25,000 personnel actively engaged in firefighting. Additionally, there are 131,000 registered volunteers; however, the legal framework and operational mechanisms needed to enable these volunteers to play an active role in the field remain incomplete. Yet these ongoing debates around firefighting capacity risk obscuring a deeper and more structural issue: the administrative reorganization of public services.<\/p>\n

Law No. 6360, which came into force in 2012, expanded the borders of metropolitan municipalities to match provincial boundaries. All villages and towns were reclassified as neighborhoods, and provincial special administrations were abolished. This was introduced as a reform expected to enhance decentralization. In practice, however, it resulted in a centralized and fragile administrative structure that has made access to public services in rural areas more difficult.<\/p>\n

Firefighting services are among the areas most affected by this transformation. The responsibility for combating fires now lies solely with metropolitan municipalities. Yet these municipalities are attempting to serve vast, geographically challenging regions without sufficient human resources, technical equipment, or logistical infrastructure. The consequences of this burden on the ground became starkly evident during the massive fires in the Aegean and Mediterranean regions in the summer of 2021. Fires that broke out in rural zones within metropolitan boundaries, such as in Mu\u011fla and Antalya, yet located far from city centers and closely intertwined with forest areas, exposed how the provisions of Law No. 6360, while coherent on paper, created serious coordination and response issues in practice.<\/p>\n

In short: every minute we boast about in response time is delayed in the countryside. Every piece of equipment we praise for capacity is tested by geography. And every new vehicle acquired cannot bear, on its own, the burden of a misaligned governance model.<\/p>\n

When we think of fire, what usually comes to mind are forests and rural areas. Yet recent events have shown that fires don\u2019t just expose crises in rural areas\u2014they reveal the same failures in governance, the same chain of negligence in the heart of urban centers as well. One of the most tragic examples was the fire at the Grand Kartal Hotel in Bolu Kartalkaya in January 2025. It wasn\u2019t just the flames that collapsed\u2014it was the entire chain of responsibility. Seventy-eight people lost their lives. Because they couldn\u2019t escape. Because there was no evacuation plan. Because the fire suppression systems weren\u2019t functioning. Because inspections had not been carried out. And perhaps most striking of all: no one had asked, \u201cIs this building truly safe?\u201d Everyone insisted they had followed the rules. But that night, it wasn\u2019t the regulations that burned\u2014it was people.<\/p>\n

In T\u00fcrkiye, the first question we still ask after a disaster is always the same: \u201cWho\u2019s responsible?\u201d After the Bolu Kartalkaya fire, the municipality said, \u201cWe weren\u2019t in charge,\u201d the governor\u2019s office said, \u201cWe had no authority,\u201d the ministry said, \u201cWe gave instructions,\u201d and the business claimed, \u201cWe followed the rules.\u201d This tragedy, in a building with no evacuation plan, non-functional fire systems, and no proper inspections, was a stark depiction of a system in collapse. A fire regulation exists, but only in theory. Fire drill requirements exist, but only on paper. Authority is fragmented, responsibility has evaporated. Not a single public official or private sector representative could say, \u201cThis was my fault.\u201d<\/p>\n

In addition, the contradictory statements between the Minister of Culture and Tourism and the Mayor of Bolu exposed the deep knots in the chain of accountability. While the Minister claimed the fire reports issued by the Bolu Municipality for the hotel had been positive, the Mayor argued that no favorable report had been issued since 2007 and that the facility lay outside the municipality\u2019s jurisdiction, falling instead under the licensing and inspection responsibility of the Ministry. The critical point in the legislation is this: regardless of which institution grants a business its license\u2014be it the municipality, a provincial administration, or the ministry\u2014fire safety reports must be issued by the municipal fire department. However, municipal fire departments cannot act beyond their own administrative borders. When deficiencies are identified, the authority to enforce sanctions lies with the institution that issued the license. This administrative tangle highlights how legal frameworks such as the Regulation on the Protection of Buildings from Fire face significant implementation challenges on the ground.<\/p>\n

The tragedy of the \u00c7etiz family, who lost their lives in the fire, and the detention of Bolu\u2019s Deputy Mayor over a report declaring a caf\u00e9 within the hotel \u201ccompliant with fire regulations,\u201d are both pieces of this grim puzzle. Allegations that the Grand Kartal Hotel had originally been licensed by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism in 1997 and that the company withdrew a 2024 inspection application after procedural irregularities, only add further complexity to the case.<\/p>\n

2025 has become, in every sense, the year of fires. Beyond the Bolu disaster, the flames engulfing the Mediterranean and Aegean coastlines, as well as the ongoing forest fires in Sakarya, Eski\u015fehir, and Bilecik, have not only ravaged nature, they have also laid bare the structural weaknesses in T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s public service organization. Chief among these are the inter-institutional confusion over authority, lack of coordination, the absence of clear national standards, and major gaps in strategic planning\u2014all of which form the weakest links in T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s firefighting response. The shortage of firefighting aircraft, limited intervention capacity, and lack of support for volunteer firefighting are merely the visible symptoms of a much deeper systemic dysfunction.<\/p>\n

Fire departments are no longer merely units that respond to fires; they have evolved into multifaceted emergency management institutions. Today, a firefighter is responsible not only for extinguishing fires, but also for responding to traffic accidents, natural disasters, floods, collapses and debris removal operations, chemical and biological hazards, and even nuclear risks and maritime accidents. In addition, they take on humanitarian duties such as providing first aid, supporting ambulance services, and rescuing animals. In short, fire services have transformed into multidisciplinary entities operating within the most complex and multilayered risk environments of modern society.<\/p>\n

However, this transformation has not yet been fully mirrored at the administrative and legal levels in T\u00fcrkiye. In contrast, many parts of the world paint a very different picture. For instance, in France, the Paris Fire Brigade (BSPP) has been organized since 1811 as a military unit under the French Army\u2019s Engineering Corps. With approximately 8,500 personnel, it is the largest urban fire service in Europe and the third largest in the world. This militarily disciplined structure operates not only in firefighting, but also in prevention, inspection, and strategic planning with a high degree of effectiveness.<\/p>\n

Similarly, in Japan, firefighting services are centrally administered by the Fire and Disaster Management Agency (FDMA), which also sets national standards, training curricula, and equipment specifications. The Tokyo Fire Department (TFD) is the most prominent example of this centralized model. With nearly 18,400 employees, advanced technological infrastructure, simulation centers, and disaster modeling systems, it is one of the largest city-based emergency response organizations in the world. Supported by more than 26,000 volunteer personnel, the TFD operates within a system of duty distribution that rivals military discipline.<\/p>\n

In Germany, the fire service operates under a hybrid model that aligns with the federal structure of the country, combining professional and volunteer elements. While much of the population is protected by volunteer fire brigades, federal organizations such as the Technisches Hilfswerk (THW) step in for logistics and heavy technical tasks. Training is provided through universities and local fire academies across many cities.<\/p>\n

In the United States, despite the decentralized state system, adherence to national standards set by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is mandatory. Matters such as response time, personnel safety, and equipment standardization are regulated by documents like NFPA 1500 and 1710. Furthermore, the SAFER program, administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), aims to expand these standards nationwide and to strengthen local firefighting capacity.<\/p>\n

When we turn back to T\u00fcrkiye, we are faced with a far more fragmented and fragile picture. Apart from the Municipal Fire Brigade Regulation dated 2006, there is no binding, nationwide, and comprehensive standard in place. Even the existing regulation is largely limited to basic administrative matters\u2014such as the color of uniforms, the types and number of vehicles. There is no equipment standardization; in some provinces, even fire departments of neighboring municipalities may be unable to connect their hoses to each other. There are major disparities in training programs: while advanced technical training is offered in some metropolitan areas, in many smaller municipalities, firefighters begin duty without having received even basic fire intervention training. More than 100 municipalities in T\u00fcrkiye still lack a professional fire brigade altogether.<\/p>\n

This situation is not merely a technical deficiency, it becomes a serious public safety risk when combined with the absence of institutional oversight and quality assurance systems. Moreover, the problem is not limited to equipment. It is also institutional, legal, and systemic. The fragmentation of authority across institutions, the disconnect between local and central government, the lack of coordination, the ambiguity of national standards, and the gaps in strategic planning do not only manifest in hotel fires in cities. Every summer, they also ignite our forests, destroy our habitats, and erode the public\u2019s sense of safety.<\/p>\n

Today in T\u00fcrkiye, firefighters are not recognized as a distinct professional class under the Civil Servants Law No. 657. Instead, they are categorized under the broader group of \u201cGeneral Administrative Services.\u201d Despite working in the highest-risk environments, this profession lacks dedicated legal protections and specialized employment rights. This leads to inequalities in many areas, from salaries and working hours to leave entitlements and retirement regulations, ultimately weakening personnel motivation and professional commitment.<\/p>\n

Even more striking is this: a firefighter who loses their life in the line of duty is not automatically recognized as a \u201cmartyr.\u201d This designation is granted only in exceptional cases and often requires a political decision. Yet someone who runs into the flames with a hose in hand, who enters collapsed buildings to rescue survivors, who risks their life while intervening in a flood\u2014such a public servant should be honored not only in spirit, but also in law. This respect must be institutionally safeguarded. Because if a country cannot protect those who save its people\u2014what kind of safety can it truly promise?<\/p>\n

Fire departments are no longer merely local service units; in this era of increasingly diverse and frequent disaster risks, they must evolve into strategic public safety institutions, organized in line with international standards. This transformation is not only structural\u2014it also demands a fundamental shift in mindset. The first step in this direction must be a redefinition of the legal status of fire services. In T\u00fcrkiye, the fragmented legislative framework that defines the scope of responsibilities leads to overlaps and delays in emergency response. For this reason, fire services must be granted a clearly defined legal status through a centralized framework, while ensuring strong enforceability at the local level.<\/p>\n

Moreover, equality in training and equipment must be guaranteed nationwide. Today, there is a significant gap between metropolitan fire departments and those of small district municipalities in terms of human resources, vehicles, equipment, and access to technology. As a matter of universal service provision, these disparities must be eliminated to ensure that all citizens have equal and timely access to high-quality emergency services.<\/p>\n

The standardization of personnel rights is not merely a matter of motivation; it is the foundation of a fair and equitable understanding of public service. The existence of varying employment conditions across different administrative structures weakens firefighters\u2019 sense of belonging and undermines service quality. Otherwise, after every new disaster, we will keep repeating the same phrases: \u201cThe team arrived late, coordination failed, the response was inadequate.\u201d But next time, those sentences will be followed by the name and age of a public servant. This is not just a failure of service delivery, it is the price of neglect and overdue reforms in public administration.<\/p>\n

To make this system sustainable and just:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Local-level organization must be strengthened.<\/strong> District and township fire departments should no longer function as passive units merely waiting for support from metropolitan centers; instead, they must be equipped with resources, training, and decision-making authority.<\/li>\n
  2. Specialized management models should be developed for metropolitan areas.<\/strong> Expert units focused on specific risks such as fires, floods, or chemical leaks, as well as professional emergency response centers that act as bridges between central and local authorities, should be established to enhance coordination.<\/li>\n
  3. Jurisdictional overlaps must be resolved, and roles clearly defined.<\/strong> Conflicts between agencies such as AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Authority), the General Directorate of Forestry, municipal fire brigades, and the Ministry of Health prolong response times and directly increase casualties.<\/li>\n
  4. National service standards must be developed and enforced.<\/strong> Minimum thresholds should be set for response times, equipment quality, and training frequency. These standards must be both auditable and reportable.<\/li>\n
  5. Strategic plans must be actionable, measurable, and results-oriented.<\/strong> Plans that exist only on paper, lack implementation, or are devoid of performance metrics fail to meet real needs on the ground. These plans should be revised after each fire season, and risk analyses should be continuously updated.<\/li>\n
  6. A legal and institutional framework for volunteer firefighting must be established.<\/strong> In many disasters, initial response comes from local volunteers. It is now essential to ensure their training, insurance, legal protections, and formal integration into the system.<\/li>\n
  7. Civil society must be included not only as an observer but also as a monitoring and decision-making actor.<\/strong> From public awareness campaigns before fires to accountability mechanisms after the fact, civil society participation will enhance transparency and public trust in the system.<\/li>\n
  8. Early warning systems, thermal cameras, drone technologies, and AI-assisted analytics must be integrated into emergency services.<\/strong> Technology not only accelerates response efforts but also enables earlier risk detection and more strategic allocation of resources.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    As I write these lines, the smoke from the flames is still rising in Eski\u015fehir. This is not just a fire; this is a fire in governance. Every delayed response burns not only nature, but also the public conscience. The fires have reminded us of a hard truth: the fire brigade is not just a hose, it is a vision of public service. And if it is the institutions themselves that are burning, who will put out the flames?<\/p>\n

    Because if \u201cthe sound of the fire engine in our ears\u201d is to echo not just one day, but every day, then that sound must not be one of fear, but of trust.<\/p>\n

    References<\/strong><\/p>\n